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"[Tihe experience and background of these investors were such that
they were in a position to make an informed investment decision,
i.e., they could fend for themselves."'
INTRODUCTION
Time and time again, hedge funds have preserved investor wealth
while broader markets experienced losses. A "hedge fund" is a type
of private investment pool that actively trades securities (and perhaps
other assets) and is not subject to the full range of disclosure obliga-
tions and limitations on investment activities imposed by the federal
securities laws.2 Although the U.S. hedge fund market is the largest in
the world, among developed nations, it is one of the least accessible. 3
Only about 8.5% of U.S. households legally qualify to invest in hedge
funds because retail investors, that is, nonwealthy individuals, are not
1. SEC v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 157 (5th Cir. 1972).
2. There is no legal or universally accepted definition of "hedge fund." See SEC,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 3 (2003) [hereinafter SEC STAFF
REPORT]. Certain distinguishing characteristics of hedge funds are discussed infra in
Parts I.A. and II.B.
3. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Ac-
credited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 406 (pro-
posed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 275) [hereinafter
Accredited Natural Person Rule]; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, UNDER THE SPOT-
LIGHT: THE REGULATION, TAXATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HEDGE FUNDS AROUND
THE GLOBE 5 (2007) (noting that "hedge funds will continue to penetrate the retail
market" around the globe).
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permitted to invest in the funds.4 By contrast, Australia, Switzerland,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Ireland have successfully permitted retail
investors to invest in hedge funds, and other foreign jurisdictions such
as the United Kingdom are in the process of expanding access. Al-
though the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed
interest in broadening access to investment strategies of the kind em-
ployed by the funds, it has yet to offer any concrete reform proposals.
Indeed, the SEC is taking steps to even further limit access to hedge
funds.5 This Article proposes specific regulatory reforms to allow fi-
nancially sophisticated retail investors to have access to and poten-
tially benefit from hedge funds. 6 The reforms proposed here further
the goal of investor protection and also create a framework for certain
hedge funds to find it profitable to market and sell shares to retail
investors.
The federal securities laws are based upon the premise that the
primary danger to investors is from predation by unscrupulous pro-
moters. However, existing regulation fails to adequately recognize
that one of the greatest risks to ordinary retail investors is from market
disturbances having nothing to do with fraud or human malfeasance. 7
4. Id. For the purposes of this Article, a retail investor is an individual not meet-
ing any of the wealth-based standards hedge funds typically rely upon to qualify for
exemptions from significant aspects of the securities laws. These exemptions are dis-
cussed in detail in Part II.B infra. A retail investor is distinguishable from a "high net
worth" individual. See Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hnwi.asp
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007). See also Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, U.S. SEC,
Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Econom-
ics n.1 (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
spch102407bgc.htm ("By 'retail investor' I mean those investors who lack the sophis-
tication or net worth to gain access to institutional markets; in other words, most
individual investors. With this definition, however, some high net worth families and
individuals don't qualify as retail investors.").
5. See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
6. Financial sophistication means that an investor "either alone or with his pur-
chaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective invest-
ment." 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2007) (crafting an exemption for offers and
sales that are otherwise available only to accredited investors). See also Accredited
Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 405 (noting that in the context of purchasing
shares of private investment pools such as hedge funds "sufficient knowledge and
financial sophistication ... enable that purchaser to evaluate the merits of a prospec-
tive investment in a private investment vehicle and to bear the economic risk of such
an investment").
7. See Stephen G. Cecchetti & Lianfa Li, Monetary Policy and Capital Regulation:
Is There a Conflict? 21 (Oct. 6, 2006) (conference draft for XIX Moneda y Crddito
Symposium, Monetary and Financial Stability: Harmony or Conflict), available at
http://www.fundacion.gruposantander.com/files/Moneda-y-Credito/cechetti.pdf (dis-
cussing the risks posed by financial imbalances and central banks' responses).
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Due to the explosive growth and integration of global financial mar-
kets and rapid financial innovation, ordinary investors saving for their
retirements by investing in a home mortgage, stocks, and bonds are
nonetheless exposed to substantial investment risks. As demonstrated
by losses in the subprime mortgage market spreading to the rest of the
economy beginning in the summer of 2007, macroeconomic shocks
can reduce the wealth of ordinary investors in even the most conserva-
tive investments. 8 Furthermore, "do-it-yourself' retail investors, at lit-
tle cost, can now bear risks associated with the most complex trading
strategies by investing in short-sales, leveraged trades, and all types of
esoteric securities such as those based upon the value of foreign cur-
rencies, interest rate fluctuations, and intangible assets like intellectual
property. 9 Hedge fund-like products are also rapidly proliferating in
the retail marketplace.' 0 Although these products do not perform as
well as genuine hedge funds, they expose retail investors to the same
kind of risks and investment complexity. 1
The SEC is mandated by law to protect investors from suffering
undue investment losses.12 Investment losses harm investors whether
the source of losses is fraud or investment risk. Accordingly, inves-
tors are protected not only when fraud is prohibited and prevented but
also when investors are permitted to reduce the risk of loss to their
portfolios by making investments commensurate with their level of
financial sophistication. Retail investors seeking to invest in hedge
funds likely have, either alone or with the assistance of a financial
adviser, sufficient sophistication to make investment decisions that re-
duce the overall risk of their portfolios. Unsophisticated retail inves-
8. Subprime lending losses led to a substantial decline in stock prices and are
expected to lead to a decrease in housing prices and increase in mortgage rates even
for home owners not involved in subprime borrowing. See Karyn McCormack,
Stocks Tumble as Credit Fears Mount, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2007, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/aug2007/pi2OO7O815_487622.htm;
Lynn Asinof, What You Need to Know About the Mortgage Industry's Woes, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2007, at DI; Gerri Willis, How the Subprime Fallout Affects You,
CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/22/pf/saving/top-
tips/index.htm.
9. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
10. See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
11. See infra Part I.D.2.
12. See, e.g., Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000) ("Whenever pursuant
to this subchapter the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is engaged in rulemak-
ing and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest, the Commission shall ... consider. .. the protection of
investors .... ); Securities Exchange Act § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. 78f(a) (2000) ("[T]he
Commission ... may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors."); Investment Company Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. 80a-2c
(2000) ("[Tjhe Commission shall ... consider... the protection of investors ... ").
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tors, by contrast, invest very little as it is and would likely have no
desire to invest in hedge funds. ' 3 Permitting sophisticated retail inves-
tors to invest in hedge funds therefore advances investor protection
while continuing to prohibit them from doing so undermines it.
With the reforms proposed in this Article, neither the SEC nor
Congress need eviscerate the federal securities regime or sacrifice in-
vestor protection. Part I finds that the defining features of hedge funds
benefit investors. Modem portfolio economics, a body of knowledge
rarely consulted by legal scholars recommending regulatory reform,
makes clear that retail investors stand to gain the most from investing
in genuine hedge funds as opposed to the hedge fund-like products
currently available in the marketplace. In Part II, the two-tiered regu-
latory structure limiting hedge funds almost exclusively to the wealthy
is examined in depth, and in Part III its rationales are found wanting.
Compared to hedge funds not registered under the federal securities
laws, registered investment vehicles employing hedge fund-like strate-
gies are not uniformly safer, less complicated, or even more transpar-
ent in ways important to retail investors. Part IV proposes a novel
approach to establishing a regulatory framework for sophisticated re-
tail investors to have access to hedge funds and for the funds to find it
attractive to sell to retail investors. Unlike previous reform proposals
and how foreign markets enable retail access to hedge funds, this Arti-
cle recommends utilization of one of the most cutting edge innova-
tions in financial markets: the establishment by large financial
institutions of electronic trading platforms for shares of privately
placed securities similar to those issued by hedge funds.
I.
HEDGE FUNDS AND RETAIL INVESTING
Hedge funds are a unique type of investment fund and their supe-
rior risk-adjusted performance owes much to their distinguishing char-
acteristics and operations. Overall trends in the hedge fund industry
have made them more institutionalized, sophisticated, and accounta-
ble. Although retail investors currently have no direct access to hedge
funds, a retail fund should retain the distinguishing characteristics of
hedge funds to provide the most value to investors.
A. Distinguishing Structure and Operation of Hedge Funds
"Hedge fund" is a term for a diverse class of private investment
companies that pool together capital from several investors into a
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
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fund. What unifies hedge funds is not their employment of a particu-
lar investment strategy or class of assets, or even that they all "hedge"
their investments (they do not). Rather, hedge funds are distinct from
other investment funds by their status under federal securities law, 14
their internal structure and relationship with investors, and their wide
range of investment practices.15
Hedge funds are usually structured as a limited partnership, but
sometimes as a limited liability company, and each investor in the
fund is a limited partner. 16 The general partner of the fund is typically
a limited liability company or a corporation. 17 The general partner is
typically also the investment adviser or manager of the fund, giving
the general partner wide latitude in activities such as managing the
fund's investment portfolio and structuring compensation. 18 In accor-
dance with partnership law, the general partnership has unlimited lia-
bility for debts not able to be satisfied by the limited partnership's
funds. 19
The other characteristic features of hedge funds have by and
large been found by financial economists to improve the welfare of
investors. Although not required by state partnership statutes, the gen-
eral partnership or individual general partners (managers) often co-
invest a significant portion of their liquid net worth directly in the
fund as limited partners. 20 Direct participation in gains and losses by
14. The unique posture of hedge funds under the federal securities laws is examined
in detail Part II.B. For clarity, only general references to such laws are made in this
Part.
15. Although hedge funds share the same legal posture and much of the same inter-
nal structure as other investment funds such as private equity funds, hedge funds'
investment activities make them unique. Thus, while hedge funds typically make
short-term trades in publicly traded securities, private equity funds make long-term
investments in illiquid private assets and often engage in buyouts, turnarounds, and
active management of under-performing companies in their portfolio. See SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8; Jonathan Bevilacqua, Comment, Convergence and Di-
vergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54
BUFF. L. REv. 251, 260 (2006). A notable trend in the financial markets is the extent
to which hedge funds are engaging in activities traditionally performed by private
equity firms. See generally id.
16. DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF
HEDGE FUNDs 3 (2005).
17. Id. at 91-93. Organizing as a general partnership is crucial to the fund and the
general partner for tax efficiency purposes. As partnerships, neither the fund nor the
general partner is taxed at the entity level; all income, gains, losses, and deductions
"pass through" to the partners who report such items on their own personal income tax
returns. Id. at 88-89.
18. Id. at 90-91.
19. Id. at 92.
20. Id. at 92; ScoTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION § 2:2.2 (2007). Us-
ing a comprehensive database of hedge funds from 1994 to 2002, Agarwal et al. found
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managers likely helps to align the incentives between managers and
investors-by curtailing excessive risk-taking, for example-and
thereby leads to higher performance. 21
Compensation for the general partner-manager comes from two
sources. Hedge fund managers, similar to other asset managers,
charge investors an annual management fee typically ranging from
1-2% of total assets under management.2 2 In addition, the manager
charges a performance-based (incentive) fee usually around 15-20%
of gains.2 3 Charging a performance fee is a defining feature of hedge
funds and is generally prohibited for investment fund managers regis-
tered under the federal securities laws.24 Another distinguishing fea-
ture of hedge fund compensation is the use of high water marks and
hurdle rates. A high water mark limits the manager's performance fee
to only a portion of gains in a given investor's account, meaning that
an investor will not be charged a performance fee until any previous
losses are recouped.25 A hurdle rate is the minimum rate of return a
fund must achieve before a performance fee can be charged, but this is
a relatively uncommon feature among the funds.26 Empirically, most
studies find a positive correlation between the level of incentive fees
and performance. 27 Looking at the combined incentives facing hedge
the average investment by managers to be 7.1%, with the median manager owning
2.4% of fund assets. Vikas Agarwal et al., Role of Managerial Incentives and Discre-
tion in Hedge Fund Performance 35 (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished article, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=889008).
21. The empirical data isolating the impact of fund manager ownership is sparse.
One paper found a significant positive correlation between managerial ownership and
performance such that a one standard deviation increase in ownership increases re-
turns by about 1.5%. Agarwal et al., supra note 20, at 5, 17. See also C~cile Le
Moigne & Patrick Savaria, Relative Importance of Hedge Fund Characteristics, 20
FIN. MARKETS PORTFOLIO MGMT. 419, 424 (2006) (compiling statistics from hedge
funds that show that personal investment positively correlates with returns).
22. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 327.
23. JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., MILKEN INST., HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND RETURNS IN
GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 32-33 (2006),
24. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 2:2.3 ("[T]he assessment of performance based
fees or profit allocations ... has been a significant distinguishing characteristic [of
hedge funds] from traditional money management."). The inability of registered in-
vestment funds to charge performance-based fees is discussed infra in notes 176-178,
217 and accompanying text.
25. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 329.
26. Id. at 330-31 (noting that a hurdle rate may be structured only to enable the
manager to charge a fee on gains above the hurdle rate or to allow a performance fee
to be charged on the entire gains so long as the hurdle is exceeded).
27. See Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72,
78 (1999) (finding that "a high incentive fee is able to align the manager's incentive
with fund performance"); Franklin R. Edwards & Mustafa 0. Caglayan, Hedge Fund
Performance and Manager Skill, 21 J. FUTURES MKTS. 1003, 1014 (2001) (finding
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fund managers, hedge funds perform better in the presence of higher
performance fees, more managerial co-investment into the fund, and
higher high water marks.2 8 The evidence is somewhat mixed regard-
ing the impact of performance fees and high water marks on the
chances of hedge fund failure, although no study has found that funds
with both higher incentive fees and high water marks have an in-
creased probability of failure.29 Career concerns have also been found
to constrain hedge fund managers who might otherwise take on too
much risk to earn performance fees. 30
Finally, hedge funds generally limit the ability of investors to re-
deem their shares. Most hedge funds allow investors to redeem shares
on a quarterly or other periodic basis.31 A fund may also implement a
"lockup" period of anywhere from six months to two years, during
which withdrawals of an initial investment are prohibited, require
prior notice before funds can be removed, and limit how much capital
can be withdrawn on a given date. 32 Greater managerial discretion in
the form of longer lockup, and notice periods, and less frequent re-
demption periods has been correlated with higher performance.
Longer capital commitments can benefit investors as a whole where
the fund invests in illiquid assets that may expose the fund to the risk
of investors overreacting to a short-term asset price decline by seeking
that "successful hedge funds appear to pay much higher incentives fees" based upon a
sample of hedge funds from January 1990 to August 1998); Hung-Gay Fung et al.,
Global Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Market Timing, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19,
25-26, 28 (2002) (finding that incentive fees have a significant positive impact on a
hedge fund's risk-adjusted return). But see BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 60 (find-
ing that higher performance fees have no impact on fund performance); WALTER
G9HIN, EDHEC RISK & ASSET MGMT. RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF THE LITERA-
TURE ON HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE § 2.1.4 (2004) (discussing mixed findings on
the relation between performance fees and fund performance).
28. Agarwal et al., supra note 20, at 5; Liang, supra note 27, at 74 (finding that
funds with high water marks outperformed funds without).
29. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 63-64 (funds with higher management and
performance fees are less likely to fail); Naohiko Baba & Hiromichi Goko, Survival
Analysis of Hedge Funds 27 (Bank of Japan, Working Paper No. 06-E-05, 2006)
(finding funds with higher incentive fees are less likely to survive while funds with
high water marks are more likely to survive). But see Guillermo Baquero et al., Sur-
vival, Look-Ahead Bias, and Persistence in Hedge Fund Performance, 40 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 493, 504 (2005) ("[T]he higher the incentive fee, ceteris
paribus, the more likely it is that the fund will liquidate in the next quarter.").
30. Stephen J. Brown et al., Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the
Hedge Fund and CTA Industry, 56 J. FIN. 1869, 1884-85 (2001).
31. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, § 1.2.
32. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 2:3.3, at 2-16-17; BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at
38 (showing that a majority of hedge funds have a lockup period of less than one
quarter).
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to redeem shares all at once.33 Greater discretion allows managers to
be more flexible or capture the gains from investing in illiquid assets
without investors prematurely withdrawing funds. 34 Studies have also
found that funds with longer lockup periods and less frequent redemp-
tion policies are less likely to fail.35 High water marks may also be
used to get investors to agree to make long-term capital commitments
through lockup and notice periods.
Another defining characteristic of hedge funds is the use of
unique investment and trading strategies to earn returns. Traditional
investment strategies typified by publicly registered mutual funds are
long-only strategies that purchase stocks and bonds and seek to earn
returns relative to how the overall market, or some sector of it, is per-
forming.36 By contrast, hedge funds pursue absolute return strategies,
seeking gains regardless of the relative direction of the market.37 The
funds pursue absolute returns through the employment of specific in-
vestment strategies or a combination of strategies. Some of the more
common distinct strategies employed by hedge funds include long/
short equity, corporate-event driven, and market-neutral funds (ac-
counting for 17, 10, and 8% of hedge fund assets under management,
respectively). 38 Funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) are hedge funds that
invest in a portfolio of underlying hedge funds, and they comprise the
largest portion of the industry, accounting for approximately 30% of
assets. 39 Unlike mutual funds, which must typically stick to a particu-
lar investment strategy, hedge funds are relatively flexible and may
33. See George 0. Aragon & Jun "QJ" Qian, Liquidation Risk and High-Water
Marks 24 (Mar. 2006) (draft article, available at http://www.mfrc.mcgill.ca/docu-
ments/QianJun.pdf).
34. Agarwal et al., supra note 20, at 9-10, 17. See also Liang, supra note 27, at 78
(finding that hedge fund performance increases with longer lockup periods).
35. BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 63-64; Baba & Goko, supra note 29, at 27-28
("[F]unds with a longer redemption notice period and a lower redemption frequency
have higher survival probabilities.").
36. See LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 1:3 (noting that traditional investment strate-
gies consist of stock, bond, and other fixed-income investments); Liang, supra note
27, at 78-81 (contrasting hedge funds with mutual funds and other traditional invest-
ment vehicles). See infra Part II.A (defining and discussing the legal posture of mu-
tual funds).
37. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 1:3.
38. BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 18. Long/short equity funds seek gains by
buying certain stocks long and selling others short. See id. at 16. Corporate event
driven funds seek returns on events like mergers or bankruptcies. See id. Market-
neutral funds seek returns by using arbitrage to take advantage of price discrepancies.
See id. For a definition of a short-sale, see infra note 42.
39. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 20. FOHFs are discussed in detail in Part
I.D. 1 infra. The term "hedge funds" as used in this Article refers to both hedge funds
not invested in other funds and FOHFs, unless otherwise distinguished.
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switch strategies and the types of assets in which they invest over
time.40 Investment flexibility likely benefits investors by allowing
managers to adapt to changing market conditions. Indeed, one study
found that poorly performing funds generally perform better after
switching styles.41
Another defining characteristic of hedge funds is the utilization
of non-traditional investments involving short sales, derivatives, and
significant amounts of leverage. 4 2 Leverage is a means of magnifying
gains or losses and includes not only borrowing capital or securities
but also purchasing derivatives and short-selling securities. 43 Deriva-
tives trading allows hedge funds to manage risk.44 These unique trad-
ing strategies provide a value to investors that traditional investments
do not.45
B. Trends in the Hedge Fund Industry
By nearly every measure, the hedge fund industry has grown in
economic significance and is expected to continue doing so. From
1999 to 2004, the global hedge fund industry nearly doubled in size,
growing from an estimated $456 billion in assets under management
to $973 billion, with the number of funds (including FOHFs) also ap-
proximately doubling to 7436 from 3617.46 By the first quarter of
40. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 1:2.3. Being a registered investment company
may limit the ability of a fund to change its strategy over time. See id. § 5:2.7.
41. See Ramin Baghai-Wadji & Stefan Kocker, Performance and Style Shifts in
the Hedge Fund Industry 33-34, 36-37 (Feb. 27, 2007) (unpublished article, available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=920444).
42. A derivative is a security whose price is derived from the value of some other
asset. STEPHEN G. CECCHETri, MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 202-03
(2006). A short-sale is a way to profit from a price decline. See id. at 204. It requires
the short-seller to borrow securities, sell them, repurchase them at a lower price, and
return the securities to the lender. Id. If successful, the short-seller profits by the
amount of the price minus the cost to borrow the shares. See id.; LEDERMAN, supra
note 20, § 1: 1, 1-3.
43. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 1:1, 1-4.
44. Yong Chen, Derivatives Use and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Hedge Fund
Industry 2 (Sept. 12, 2006) (unpublished article, available at http://www.fma.org/
SLC/DSS/Deriv-FMA.pdf) (finding hedge funds that use derivatives exhibit lower
risk than nonusers). However, accurately pricing complex and illiquid derivatives
remains a significant challenge. See ALTERNATIVE INV. MGMT. ASS'N, ASSET PRIC-
ING AND FUND VALUATION PRACTICES IN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 6 (2005) (find-
ing that pricing illiquid and complex derivatives were identified by hedge fund
managers to be their most significant valuation challenge) (hereinafter AIMA 2005
SURVEY].
45. See discussion infra Part I.C.
46. COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP II, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL
STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE app. at B-10 (2005) [hereinafter CRMPG
STUDY].
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2007, hedge funds managed about $1.5 trillion in assets globally,
spread across more than 13,000 funds.47 They will likely surpass $2
trillion in assets before the end of the decade 48 and may even reach $6
trillion by 2015.49 The U.S. market accounts for over $1 trillion of the
global industry.50 As a proportion of total investment into hedge
funds, individuals' direct investment (i.e., not through FOHFs, pen-
sion plans, or other institutions) is decreasing and projected to
continue decreasing while that of institutional investors, especially
pensions, is on the rise.5 1 In non-U.S. jurisdictions, retail investors are
expected to increase their investments into hedge funds. 52
Large financial institutions are increasingly providing hedge
fund-adviser (management) services. Two of the largest hedge fund
managers in the United States are Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan As-
set Management;5 3 other large investment banks are making inroads
into the sector through acquisitions of single-manager funds.54 Prime
brokerage services (e.g., lending, trade clearing, and risk management)
are typically carried out by established investment banks and securi-
ties broker-dealer firms registered with the SEC.5 5 As hedge funds
have become larger, more sophisticated, and employ more complex
47. See Press Release, HedgeFund Intelligence, Global Hedge Fund Assets Surge to
$1.5 Trillion According to HedgeFund Intelligence Research (Mar. 27, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.hedgefundintelligence.comimages/590/globalhedgefundassets-
asiahedge.pdf; Ken Schachter, Hedge Funds Grow Like Kudzu, RED HERRING, Feb.
26, 2007, available at http://www.redherring.com/Home/21446.
48. See, e.g., Denise Valentine, The Hedge Fund Marketplace Today, BUILDING AN
EDGE (IBM), Mar. 22, 2005, at 7.
49. GEORGE P. VAN, VAN HEDGE FUND ADVISORS INT'L, HEDGE FUND DEMAND
AND CAPACITY 2005-2015, at 6 (2005).
50. Alex Akesson, Survey Shows US Hedge Funds to Hold $1,200 Billion In Assets,
HEDGECO.NET, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.hedgeco.net/news/03/2007/survey-shows-
us-hedge-funds-to-hold-billions-in-assets.html.
51. BANK OF N.Y. & CASEY, QUIRK & Assocs., INSTITUTIONAL DEMAND FOR
HEDGE FUNDS 2, at 14 (2006) (predicting that retirement plans will constitute 65% of
asset flows to hedge funds through 2010).
52. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 5.
53. Shaheen Pasha, Banks' Love Affair With Hedge Funds, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct.
6, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/1O/05/news/companies/banks-hedgefunds/
index.htm?postversion=2006100607.
54. See William Hutchings, Banks Place Big Bets on Growth, FIN. NEWS ONLINE,
Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.efinancialnews.com/homepage/peoplemoves/content/
1046676662/restricted; Morgan Stanley: A Big Bet on Hedge Funds, BUSINESS-
WEEK.COM, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/nov20O6/pi
20061101_517314.htm?chan=top+news+indexbusinessweek+exclusives.
55. Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Charles J. Gra-
dante, Managing Principal of The Hennessee Group LLC), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/_files/gradante.pdf ("The top 10 Prime Brokers [of all hedge
funds] are registered broker dealers and regulated by the SEC.") [hereinafter Gradante
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trading strategies, prime brokers face increasing pressures to deliver
more sophisticated, integrated, and customized services to remain
competitive. 56 Greater sophistication and the ability to provide cus-
tomized services places the hedge fund industry in a better position to
provide standardized and low-cost services to retail investors.
Although hedge fund operations have increased in complexity
during the past decade, there is no empirical basis to conclude that
such complexity has increased their risk to investors. To the contrary,
in important ways, hedge funds have become less risky than in prior
years. 57 Generally, as financial markets have become more complex,
those markets have also become more stable. 58 Hedge funds have
likewise increased their stability, or decreased some of their risks to
investors, in part because of their increasingly complex transactions
and trading strategies, not in spite of it. 5 9
Lower risk to investors is also the result of improved industry-
wide risk management practices. 60 The hedge fund industry has sub-
stantially improved its risk management practices since the massive
contraction of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
in 1998.61 In response to LTCM, twelve major commercial and in-
Testimony]; BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 45 (implying that of the funds reporting
which prime broker they utilized, 69% utilized large and well-known financial firms).
56. See, e.g., Cutthroat Competition, MARHEDGE, Dec. 5, 2005, at 17; Paul Allen,
Prime Time for Primes, WALL STREET & TECH., Mar. 2006, at 35, 35; Prime Broker-
age Debate: The Race to Keep Up With the Clients, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2006, http://
www.euromoney.com/article.asp?PositionlD=5056&ArticlelD= 1083644; Service
Provider Battle Shifts to the Middle Office, HEDGEWEEK, Jan. 8, 2007, http://
www.hedgeweek.com/articles/pdLpage.jsp?contentid=44845.
57. "Risk" is the chance of economic loss. See discussion infra Part I.C.
58. See CRMPG STUDY, supra note 46, at app. B-10.
59. For example, the development of derivatives transactions known as "credit de-
fault swaps" allows hedge funds and other financial entities to manage exposures to
the risks involved with lending. See STACEY FACTER, JPMORGANCHASE, CREDIT DE-
FAULT SWAPS AND TRADE: A USEFUL TOOL FOR DISTRIBUTING RISK, http://www.jp
morgan.com/cm/ContentServer?c=TSContent&pagename=jpmorgan%2Fts%2FTS_
Content%2FGeneral&cid=l 136555202065 (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); CRAIG M. VAR-
RELMAN & LEWIS TATANANNI, GE ASSET MGMT., CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS-INTO
THE MAINSTREAM (2005), available at http://www.geam.com/common/newsdocs/wp_
creditdefault.pdf.
60. Press Release, Mercer Oliver Wyman, New Study Reveals Strengthened Global
Hedge Fund Industry Risk Management Practices and Highlights Areas for Improve-
ment 1 (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf-files/
Global_HedgeFundRMMOW0606.pdf.
61. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT Viii (1999), available at
http://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (reporting findings of U.S. finan-
cial market regulators after the collapse of LTCM). But see Fin. Economists Round-
table, Statement on Long-Term Capital Management and the Report of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets, FINANCIER, Summer 1999, at 6, 6-7 (criticiz-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 11:251
2008] HEDGE FUND MARKET FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 263
vestment banks formed the Counterparty Risk Management Policy
Group. This group issued two detailed reports, one in June of 1999
and another in July of 2005, explaining how the financial sector could
improve risk management practices. 62 Hedge funds have largely fol-
lowed such recommendations by continuing to standardize proce-
dures, employing more sophisticated controls, and committing
significant resources to risk personnel, operations, and external moni-
toring. 63 For example, the use of "stress testing" to observe responses
to extreme price movements is now pervasive throughout the
industry.64
These improvements are driven by the underlying economics of
the industry, indicating that hedge funds and counterparties 65 will
have the incentive and the means to continue toward greater stability.
First, the rising involvement of large investment banks and other insti-
tutions as fund managers and prime brokers66 increases the funds' and
counterparties' ability to bear and monitor risk because such parties
have more resources and likely have more sophisticated management
systems and expertise than stand-alone funds. Second, hedge funds
are seeking to improve and disclose more information about their risk
management practices to attract capital from large institutional inves-
tors.67 This would benefit retail investors without substantial bargain-
ing power as such practices become standardized across the industry.
ing findings and policy recommendations of President's Working Group regarding
LTCM).
62. See CRMPG STUDY, supra note 46, at 1. Other groups have also since released
hedge fund best practice guidelines. See generally MANAGED FUNDS Assoc., SOUND
PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS (2005); AlMA 2005 SURVEY, supra note 44.
63. See Press Release, Mercer Oliver Wyman, supra note 60, at 1.
64. id. at 5.
65. A "counterparty" is simply the other party taking part in a financial transaction.
See, e.g., Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/counterparty.asp (last
visited Feb. 5, 2008).
66. See Pasha, supra note 53 (describing banks' increasing involvement with hedge
funds).
67. See BANK OF N.Y. & CASEY, QUIRK & Assocs., supra note 51, at 8-10; Lauren
Keyson, Top Five Hedge Fund Trends For 2007, FORBES.COM, Jan. 18, 2007, http://
www.forbes.com/2007/01/19/hedge-funds-snl-pf-ied-in1lk 011 8soapbox-inl.html;
Allen, supra note 56, at 35 ("Market maturity-specifically the institutionalization of
the investor universe and heightened regulation-means hedge funds are facing de-
mands for better risk analysis, performance measurement and reporting; more robust
operational infrastructures; and greater transparency."); BARRY KOLATCH & LYNN
CONNOLLY, DELOTE RESEARCH, PRECAUTIONS THAT PAY OFF: RISK MANAGEMENT
AND VALUATION PRACTICES IN THE GLOBAL HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 2 (2007)
("[Hedge funds] that will thrive in this new competitive environment will be those
that pay particular attention to risk management and valuation so that they can attract
institutional funds .. ").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Several indicators suggest that improved risk management prac-
tices have, indeed, reduced risks to investors and will continue to do
so. Hedge fund failure rates have decreased during the past several
years and are expected to keep decreasing. 68 The more careful studies
distinguishing between hedge funds that stop reporting to databases
from those that cannot continue to operate find failure rates some-
where between 3-5%, with no trend of increasing failure. 69 As op-
posed to failures from poor investment decisions, operational issues
(e.g., fraud, trade processing, and accounting) are the primary reasons
why hedge funds fail, 70 suggesting that failure rates may decrease due
to the improvements being made in operational management. Manag-
ers close hedge funds more often due to failing to meet performance
expectations rather than being forced to cease operations due to poor
investment choices. 7 1 Importantly, larger funds, and those with more
experienced managers, tend to have lower failure rates, suggesting the
industry may be less prone to failure as the average fund size grows
and industry experience becomes more widespread.7 2 In addition, one
study found that as of March 2003, only 4% of hedge funds, represent-
68. Hedge Fund Attrition Rate Continues to Decline, Says Hennessee,
HEDGEWEEK, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.hedgeweek.conarticles/detail.jsp?contentid
=47820.
69. Fabrice Rouah, Competing Risks in Hedge Fund Survival 26 (Jan. 2006) (un-
published article, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=840
505) (finding failure rate to be 3-5% with no trend of increasing); Hyuna Park, Risk
Measures for Hedge Funds and a Survival Analysis 27 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished
article, available at http://www.isenberg.umass.edu/doctoral/uploads/listWidget/
15052/Ch2_SurvivalHyunaPark.pdf) (finding the "real failure" rate for hedge funds
at 3.1% and lower than the attrition (closure) rate of 8.7%).
70. See THE CAPITAL MKTS. CO., UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING OPERATIONAL
RISK IN HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS: A CAPCO WHITE PAPER 5 (2005), available at
http://www.capco.com/assets/DFA90A4A-E6DD-4F62-9466-ACD 1A05A25FF.pdf
(finding that "54% of failed funds had identifiable operational issues and half of all
failures could be attributed to operational risk alone"); Interview with Jean-Ren6 Gi-
raud, CEO of EDHEC-Risk Advisory, Jan. 18, 2006, http://www.edhec-risk.com/
siteedhecrisk/public/Interview/RISKArticle.2006-01-18.3323 ("[M]ore than 60% of
hedge fund failures can be directly related to operational issues that have nothing to
do with the financial performances and risks of the investment... [w~ith two-thirds of
these operational failures being directly related to different forms of fraud .. ");
CORENTIN CHRISTORY ET AL., EDHEC RISK & ASSET MGMT. RESEARCH CTR., QUAN-
TIFICATION OF HEDGE FUND DEFAULT RISK 4 (2007) ("[Iln the case of blow-ups, oper-
ational risk greatly exceeds the risk related to the investment strategy .... ).
71. See THE CAPITAL MKTS. Co., supra note 70, at 4 ("[D]iscretionary fund clo-
sures . . . are much more frequent and are often driven by the business or market
expectations of the fund manager."); Park, supra note 69, at 27.
72. See, e.g., Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds 71 (MIT Sloan
Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4535-05, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=671443 (finding that age, assets under management, cumulative returns, and
fund flows have a significantly negative impact on liquidation probability); Baba &
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ing 1% of assets, are "undercapitalized," meaning that they do not
have enough equity relative to the risk of their underlying
investments.73
Hedge funds, nonetheless, still face significant risk management
challenges, in particular from valuation of illiquid assets and opera-
tional risks associated with private, over-the-counter derivatives trad-
ing.74 There are also some indications that new risks have emerged,
largely due to the recent growth in the number of hedge funds. First,
as more funds enter an increasingly crowded market, some funds may
find it more difficult to earn returns without taking on added risk, and
consequently, a greater absolute number of firms may fail. 75 Second,
hedge funds' returns may be increasingly correlated to general market
trends as the industry grows, implying a greater vulnerability to mar-
ket risk factors. 76 Nonetheless, these new risks do not seem to have
substantially diminished the value of hedge funds to investors given
the continued and projected increases in hedge fund investments. 77
In sum, joining the mainstream of financial markets has made
hedge funds more accountable, more transparent, and provided impor-
tant institutional constraints on funds' activities. When publicly
traded financial firms offer hedge funds and act as prime brokers that
finance trades and lend securities to the funds, they put their own capi-
tal and reputations on the line and hence have strong incentives to
manage risk and monitor fund investments. 78 There is practically no
Goko, supra note 29, at 27 (finding funds with greater assets under management have
higher survival probability).
73. Anurag Gupta & Bing Liang, Do Hedge Funds Have Enough Capital? A Value-
at-Risk Approach, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 248 (2005).
74. KOLATCH & CONNOLLY, supra note 67, at 2, 8, 12-13 (noting deficiencies in
hedge fund practices such as insufficient utilization of independent third-parties for
valuation and insufficient use of stress testing); Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, Remarks at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16,
2006), (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20060516a.htm) (noting potential problems with settling over-the-counter
trades in credit derivatives); AlMA 2005 SURVEY, supra note 44, at 6.
75. Baba & Goko, supra note 29, at 28 (finding that as the number of total hedge
funds becomes larger the survival probability significantly falls); Justin Lahart, Ahead
of the Tape, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C1.
76. See, e.g., BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 54 (noting increased correlations
between hedge fund returns and equity returns such that "rather than being a good
hedge to stock returns, hedge fund returns have recently tended to move more closely
in line with them").
77. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
78. As the consequences of the summer 2007 collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge
funds illustrate, potential losses from failing to appropriately manage risk include a
substantial drop in stock price, legal liability, accounting losses, job losses, and a loss
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risk that an established financial firm would sponsor a retail hedge
fund to dupe unwary unsophisticated investors into buying its shares
based on a false promise of exorbitant returns. Unlike unestablished
companies that may attempt to profit from bilking investors out of
their money and then disappearing, 79 established financial firms have
a long-term presence and other lines of business to protect and there-
fore have substantial economic incentives to make truthful and accu-
rate representations to hedge fund investors. Because established
financial firms would likely be the primary providers of hedge funds
to retail investors if such a market existed, 80 retail investors would
benefit from the institutional safeguards that go along with their
services.
C. Retail Investing: Risk, Return, and Portfolio Diversification
To get the most benefit from investing, investors should seek to
maximize returns for the level of risk they are willing to bear-so-
called risk-adjusted returns. 8' Risk is simply "the chance that.., the
in hedge fund and prime brokerage clientele. See Grace Wong, Pink Slips Hit Wall
St.; Bear Stearns Pares 240, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 17, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/16/markets/wallstreet bonusesjobs/ (reporting that Bear Steams fired ap-
proximately 240 employees, including its co-president, subsequent to large hedge
fund losses); Vikas Bajaj, Bear Steams Shakes Up Funds Unit, N.Y. TIMIES, June 30,
2007, at CI (reporting that Bear Steams fired the executive in charge of two collapsed
hedge funds); Dan Wilchins & Dane Hamilton, Bear Rivals Say Courting Prime Bro-
ker Clients, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2007 (reporting that Bear Steams may lose prime
brokerage business and be less able to extend credit due to losses in its hedge funds
business); Mark Pittman, Bear Stearns Fund Collapse Sends Shock Through CDOs,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 21, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601
087&refer=home&sid=ahWfhEJ7dra4 (reporting that Bear Stearns' hedge "funds had
borrowed at least $6 billion from the biggest names on Wall Street"); James Herron,
Fund Investors Launch Bear Claims, USAToDAY.COM, Aug. 1, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-08-01-4138637345_x.htm (describing an
arbitration claim filed against Bear Stearns by investors in its failed hedge funds).
79. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Student's Phony Fund Attracted Millions, CHI.
TRIB., June 7, 2006, at 4 (reporting that a man fraudulently posed as a hedge fund
representative and "forged multimillion-dollar checks and passed them quickly
through banks in Greenwich, New York and Switzerland, hoping to cash out before
they caught on").
80. See Gail Marks Jarvis, Taking All Ego Out of Investing in Hedge Funds, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 29, 2006, at 5.
81. Risk-adjusted return is a measure of an investment's return compared to how
risky the investment is. See LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 1:3. The standard measure
of risk-adjusted returns is the Sharpe ratio. Id. A Sharpe ratio is calculated by divid-
ing an investment's return in excess of the return to a hypothetical "risk-free" invest-
ment (typically proxied by the return on the ninety-day U.S. Treasury bill) by the
standard deviation of the returns (i.e., how dispersed the investment's returns are
around its average). Id.
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securities you hold will fall in price."' 82 The fundamental and well-
documented relationship between a security's risk and return charac-
teristics is that they rise and fall together: to receive a higher rate of
return, an investor must bear more risk.83 Modern finance has one
overriding lesson: investors can minimize risk by placing their capital
into a diverse portfolio of securities from numerous different issuers
and different types of assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, commodities, real
estate, etc.). 84 Diversification reduces risk to the extent the perform-
ance of the securities in a portfolio are not related to each other. 85
That way, if some securities perform poorly, others may perform well,
and the net effect is to insulate a portfolio from overall losses. As.
Nobel prize-winning economist James Tobin aptly summarized, diver-
sification means "don't put all your eggs in one basket. '86
Because the performance of a company's securities depends on,
or is correlated with, various external market factors separate from
how the company itself is performing (e.g., interest rates, consumer
spending, the value of the dollar), in practice, diversification requires
creating a portfolio of securities whose returns are not correlated with
the same external market factors. 87 However, it is impossible to com-
pletely eliminate risk through diversification. This is because the re-
turns of most securities have at least some correlation to external
market movements, and thus, to some extent, move up and down in
tandem. 88 This market-correlation risk, which cannot completely be
diversified away, is identified by economists as "systematic" risk. 89
Thus, when choosing to add new securities to an already-existing port-
folio, an investor's basic choice is whether to increase or decrease
overall risk and expected returns by creating a portfolio more or less
correlated with general market factors.90 For instance, an investor can
almost completely eliminate risk by investing in low-yield U.S. gov-
82. Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAW 29, 29 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
83. Id. at 30.
84. Id. at 32.
85. See id. at 32-33.
86. James Tobin, Nobel Economists Lecture Series at Trinity University (Apr. 30,
1985) (transcript available at http://www.trinity.edu/nobel/Tobinfiles/
Tobin%20web%20quotes.htm).
87. Malkiel, supra note 82, at 33-34.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 34. By contrast, the risks that arise from company-specific characteristics
or actions (e.g., poor business judgment, employee retention, financial misstatements)
are "unsystematic" or idiosyncratic risks and can be substantially reduced through
diversification because such risks are not correlated with general market trends and
the returns of other issuers. Id. at 35.
90. Id. at 36.
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ernment bonds because their returns are practically guaranteed and
thus have no correlation with external market trends. 91
When portfolio diversification is the goal of investing, the value
of hedge funds becomes evident. Hedge funds' pursuit of absolute
returns is just another way of stating that they pursue returns uncorre-
lated with general market factors, or returns with low systematic
risk.92 The empirical evidence shows that hedge funds, despite signif-
icant differences by type and over time, have been successful in ob-
taining positive returns throughout various market conditions.93 While
hedge fund returns are not always greater than those of traditional in-
vestments, due to manager skill, they have generally achieved superior
risk-adjusted returns-so-called "alpha." '94
Figure 1 compares average yearly hedge fund returns (as mea-
sured by two separate academic studies) to those of the general market
(as measured by returns to the S&P 500 Index) from 1996 to 2003.95
91. Economists typically use the rate of return on a short-term U.S. Treasury bill as
a measure of a "risk-free" rate because the federal government is unlikely to default
on its loans. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 188 (8th ed. 2006).
92. See Liang, supra note 27, at 78 (noting that "hedge funds are absolute perform-
ers .. . [with no] relative benchmark" and finding empirically that "the low beta value
for... hedge fund groups indicate that hedge funds have low systematic risk... ").
93. See Roger Ibbotson & Peng Chen, The A,BCs of Hedge Funds: Alphas, Betas,
and Costs 16 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=733264 (finding the compounded annual return for hedge
funds from 1995 to April 2006 to be 9%); Harry M. Kat & Joelle Miffre, The Impact
of Non-Normality Risks and Tactical Trading on Hedge Fund Alphas 7-8 (Cass Bus.
Sch., City Univ. London, Faculty of Fin. Working Paper Series WP-FF-21-2005,
2006), available at http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/facfin/papers/WP2005/WP-FF-21-
2005_MiffreKat.pdf (finding an annualized average return from hedge funds of 12%
from January 1985 to August 2004).
94. See Robert Kosowski et al., Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A Bayesian and
Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 229, 262-63 (2007); Bill Ding & Hany A.
Shawky, The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies and the Asymmetry of Return
Distributions, 13 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 309, 329 (2007) (finding that from 1990 to 2003,
all hedge fund categories achieved above average performance when measured
against an aggregate equity market index); Ibbotson & Chen, supra note 93, at 14
(finding that "when combined with stock, bond, and cash portfolios, hedge funds add
positive alpha and excellent diversification"); Kat & Miffre, supra note 93, at 16-17
(finding the representative hedge fund manager to have superior trading skills but
noting that previous studies and their own may overstate alpha); Daniel Capocci &
Georges Hdbner, Analysis of Hedge Fund Performance, 11 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 55, 77
(2004) (finding that hedge funds as a whole "[d]eliver significant excess returns").
95. The academic studies upon which the annual hedge fund returns in Figure 1 are
based explicitly on control for biases in hedge fund data that might exaggerate their
gains. See Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 80, 81-84 (2005); William Fung et al., Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk
and Capital Formation 2-3, 25 tbl. 1 (July 19, 2006) (unpublished paper presented at
the AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=778124).
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As Figure 1 illustrates, hedge fund returns, while not always greater
than market returns, almost always produced gains regardless of the
direction of the general market. It also shows that hedge fund returns
are more steady (i.e., less volatile) than those of the market. 96
40.00%
20.00% 
....... Market Returns (S&P
E 10.00% -- I A
•___ _._._._. _, -- Hedge Fund Returns
09 0.00% (Fung et al. 2006)
Hedge Fund Returns
-10.00%........ (Malkiel & Saha 2005)
-20.00%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
-30.00%
Year
Another way to evaluate absolute return strategies is to isolate
hedge fund returns when the general market is negative. The experi-
ence of funds investing in hedge funds (i.e., returns to FOHFs) from
January 1990 to December 2006 illustrates that most hedge funds had
either no losses or had gains during those months when the general
market experienced losses. 97 In particular, during the 2000-2002 bear
market, the S&P 500 had an average annual loss of 15.5%, and the
NASDAQ Composite Index likewise lost 30.6% annually, but the av-
erage annual return for hedge funds was a gain of approximately
3.46%.98 And in the summer months of 2007, while losses from the
subprime mortgage market led to a 3.7% decrease in the S&P 500,
hedge fund returns as a whole decreased by approximately 0.24% dur-
ing that time period.99 This means that investors would have gener-
96. However, Figure 1 does not illustrate that different hedge fund types have sub-
stantial differences in returns. See Malkiel & Saha, supra note 95, at 81.
97. CRESTMONT RESEARCH, PERSPECTIVES ON HEDGE FUND INVESTING 18 (2007),
available at http://www.crestmontresearch.com/pdfs/HF%201ndustry%2OPresenta-
tion.pdf.
98. WALL ST. JOURNAL, EcONSTATS, MAJOR INDICES, http://www.econstats.com/
eqty/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008) (detailing S&P 500 and NASDAQ Com-
posite Index returns). Hedge fund annual returns are based upon the average of those
in: Malkiel & Saha, supra note 95, at 83 tbl. 3 panel B; and Fung et al., supra note
95, at 2-3, 25 tbl. 1.
99. The S&P 500 opened the month of June 2007 at 1530.62 and closed August
2007 at 1473.96. See WALL ST. JOURNAL, EcONSTATS, S&P 500 (LARGE CAP) INDEX
AND CORRELATIONS WITH SP500, http://www.econstats.com/eqty/eqem-mi- .htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2008). For June, July, and August 2007, the HFRI Fund
Weighted Composite Index reports returns of 0.73, 0.08, and -1.53, respectively. See
HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, HFRI FUND WEIGHTED COMPOSITE INDEX, https://
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
ally been better off with a diversified portfolio of hedge funds than
with a diversified portfolio of stocks.
Producing positive returns in various market conditions and help-
ing to diversify a portfolio requires hedge fund returns to have a rela-
tively low correlation to general market factors. This aspect of hedge
fund returns has been well-documented in academic literature for at
least a decade. 100 Figure 2 illustrates this relatively low correlation by
using the statistical property known as R2 .1°I In this context, a distri-
bution of R2 closer to 100% (the right-hand part of the chart) simply
means that the issuer's returns are better explained by, or more corre-
lated to, the general market factors (and vice versa). As the figure
strikingly demonstrates, hedge fund returns are substantially less cor-
related to general market movements than traditional buy-and-hold
mutual funds.
www.hedgefundresearch.com (requires free registration; on file with the New York
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy). The HFRI Index states that it is
constructed so as to correct for biases which may exaggerate the performance of
hedge funds. See HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, HFR INDICES - BASIC METHODOLOGY
AND FAQ 4 (2007), https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/HFRI-HFRXFAQ.pdf.
However, even if the highest estimated upward biases in hedge fund returns were
applicable to HFR's summer 2007 return figures, the funds would have still substan-
tially outperformed the market. See Ibbotsen & Chen, supra note 93, at 6-8 (finding
that backfill and survivorship biases exaggerated hedge fund returns annually by
5.68% and 5.01%, respectively, or monthly by approximately 0.47% and 0.42%).
100. See, e.g., William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Empirical Characteristics of Dy-
namic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 275,
279-82 (1997); William K.H. Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge Funds: An Industry in
Its Adolescence, EcON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2006, at 1, 7-8, available at http://
www.frbatlanta.org/publ.cfm [hereinafter Fung & Hsieh, Hedge Funds] (demonstrat-
ing the relatively low correlation of hedge fund returns to general market factors, such
as North American equity returns, emerging market equities, bonds, and the value of
the dollar).
101. See Fung & Hsieh, Hedge Funds, supra note 100, at 8. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta is the publisher of Fung and Hsieh's article in the Economic Review.
On its website, the bank grants permission to reproduce from its publications for not-
for-profit uses and requests a copy of the publication with the abstracted materials,
http://www.frbatlanta.org/publ.cfm (follow Disclaimers and Terms of Use).
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Because hedge fund returns have relatively low correlation to
general market trends, they can diversify a traditional portfolio and
reduce systematic risk or the correlation of a portfolio's returns to
market factors. 10 2 Accordingly, adding hedge funds to a traditional
portfolio will generally reduce the portfolio's risk of loss, because in-
cluding the funds will reduce the vulnerability of the portfolio to mar-
ket downturns. 0 3 As with all other securities, how and to what extent
adding those of hedge funds to a portfolio will reduce systematic risk
depends on several factors, such as which assets the portfolio is al-
ready composed of and which particular funds are added.'04
Likewise, there are limits to how much hedge funds can help di-
versify a portfolio. This is because hedge funds have their own sys-
tematic risk factors-risks that cannot be diversified away. First,
though less so than traditional investments, hedge fund returns typi-
cally have some correlation to general market factors, 0 5 which limits
the funds' ability to completely diversify away market-correlation risk
when added to a portfolio. A second limitation on how well hedge
funds can reduce overall portfolio risk is the funds' own unique risk
102. See, e.g., Jean-Franqois Bacmann & Gregor Gawron, Fat-Tail Risk in Portfolio
of Hedge Funds and Traditional Investments, in HEDGE FUNDS: INSIGHTS IN PER-
FORMANCE MEASUREMENT, RISK ANALYSIS, AND PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION 491,
491-513 (Greg N. Gregoriou et al. eds., 2005) (demonstrating that "the risk of a tradi-
tional portfolio is reduced when hedge funds are added").
103. See infra text accompanying note 111.
104. See, e.g., Bacmann & Gowran, supra note 103, at 512 ("[T]he benefits of the
inclusion of hedge funds in a traditional portfolio depend on the initial composition of
the portfolio and on the type of hedge fund added to the portfolio.").
105. See, e.g., Fung et al., supra note 95, at 13.
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properties. One property is the potential to have relatively extreme
losses. 106 Another is a possibility that hedge fund returns may become
more correlated to general market trends during downturns, notwith-
standing their typically low correlation to market movements. 107 Yet
another is the potential for poor performance in some hedge funds to
spill over to different types of funds.10 8 Diversifying one's hedge
fund holdings may reduce such risks, but increasing allocations to
hedge funds may also increase them.'0 9
However, though hedge funds do share some risks of traditional
investments and have unique risks of their own, a large and sophisti-
cated body of academic and practitioner research finds that adding
hedge funds to a traditional portfolio benefits investors.11 0 At least
106. This is because hedge fund returns are asymmetric, or do not follow a "normal"
bell curve shaped pattern. Hedge fund returns often exhibit so-called "higher mo-
ment" statistical properties known as "negative skew" and excess "kurtosis." See,
e.g., Chris Brooks & Harry M. Kat, The Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Index
Returns and Their Implications for Investors, 5 J. ALTERNATIVE INVS. 26, 42-43
(2002); Malkiel & Saha, supra note 95, at 80.
107. Monica Bilio et al., Phase-Locking and Switching Volatility in Hedge Funds 38
(Dep't of Econ., Ca' Foscari Univ. of Venice, Working Paper No. 54, 2006) (finding
"that exposures [to market factors] can be strongly different in the down-market...
regimes compared to normal times[,] suggesting that risk exposures of hedge funds in
the down-market regimes are quite different than those faced during normal re-
gimes"); Javier Mencfa, Testing Dependence Between Financial Returns, An Applica-
tion to the Hedge Fund Industry 3 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished paper, available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=870000) (finding that "when strong shocks to the market occur...
diversification benefits [of hedge funds] seem to deteriorate due to non-linear depen-
dence"). But see Nicole M. Boyson et al., Is There Hedge Fund Contagion? 26, 30
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=884202) (find-
ing no evidence that extreme losses in currency, fixed income, and equity markets are
correlated to extreme losses in the hedge fund indices).
108. See Boyson et al., supra note 107, at 26-27 (finding strong evidence of conta-
gion across hedge funds of different styles).
109. See, e.g., Harry M. Kat, Integrating Hedge Funds into the Traditional Portfolio,
in HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 102, at 3, 6.
110. See, e.g., R. McFall Lamm, Jr., Asymmetric Returns and Optimal Hedge Fund
Portfolios, J. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, Fall 2003, at 9 ("[O]ptimal hedge fund
portfolios should have up to a 30% smaller allocation to distressed debt than symmet-
ric return models indicate .. .offset by larger allocations to equity market neutral,
rotational, and systematic macro strategies, which produce more positively skewed
portfolios."); Jan-Hein Cremers et al., Optimal Hedge Fund Allocations: Do Higher
Moments Matter?, 32 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 70, 70 (2005) (finding that "higher mo-
ments of hedge funds do not meaningfully compromise the efficacy of mean-variance
optimization" where investors are generally risk-averse); Niclas Hagelin et al., Hedge
Fund Allocation Under Higher Moments and Illiquidity, in HEDGE FUNDS, supra note
102, at 105-28 (finding that "gains from allocating into hedge funds occur even when
possible effects of deviations from normality in the hedge fund data are taken into
account"); Jean Brunel, Revisiting the Role of Hedge Funds in Diversified Portfolios,
in HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 102, at 129-49 (concluding that despite hedge funds'
unique risks, "there is indeed a role for nontraditional, hedge fund-type strategies in
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one study found that a diversified portfolio of hedge funds is less risky
and generally preferable to a diversified portfolio of stocks."' None
of the foregoing implies that all investors should add hedge funds to
their portfolios; nor does it imply that hedge funds are risk-free or
always less risky than traditional investments. After considering tax
consequences and the widening array of financial products available,
investors may find hedge funds to be less attractive. 12 Nevertheless,
hedge funds have been proven to decrease the volatility of investment
portfolios and present an attractive investment opportunity for sophis-
ticated retail investors.
D. The Retail Fund of Hedge Funds
Retail investors would need access to the unique characteristics
and operations of genuine hedge funds in order to fully benefit from
the funds' ability to diversify a portfolio. For retail investors, this ac-
cess would most likely take the form of a FOHF. Although they can
purchase investments resembling or related to hedge funds, no option
currently available to retail investors fully captures the benefits of
hedge funds.
1. Characteristics and Operation of a Retail Hedge Fund
To obtain the most benefits from hedge fund investing, retail in-
vestors must have access to funds that are able to charge a perform-
ance fee, undertake a wide variety of investment strategies, and limit
redemptions by investors. In order for retail investors to make in-
diversified portfolios"); Bacmann & Gawron, supra note 102, at 491 (finding the opti-
mal allocation of hedge funds to an initial portfolio consisting primarily of bonds to be
approximately 50%); Ivilina Popova et al., Optimal Hedge Fund Allocation with
Asymmetric Preferences and Distributions 2 (May 1, 2006) (unpublished paper, avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract=900012) (showing "that conditional on the investor's
objective, a substantial allocation to hedge funds is justified even with consideration
for the highly unusual skewness and kurtosis").
111. See Todd Brulhart & Peter Klein, Faulty Hypotheses and Hedge Funds, CANA-
DIAN INVESTMENT REV., Summer 2005, at 6, 10-11, available at http://www.aima-
canada.org/doc-bin/SUMMER2005_aimawinner.pdf (finding large allocations to
hedge funds appropriate because hedge fund indices have lower overall risk than eq-
uity indices).
112. Hedge funds are typically structured as limited partnerships or limited liability
companies and for that reason short-term gains are taxed as ordinary income tax,
whereas gains from investing in other investments, such as mutual funds, may be
taxed at the lower long-term capital gains rate. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at
89; Henry Blodget, The Wall Street Self-Defense Manual: Please Do Not Buy Hedge
Funds, SLATE.COM, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2155871/entry/2156310.
For alternatives to hedge funds that capture some of their benefits, see infra Part
I.D.2.
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formed investment decisions and to reduce the incidence of fraud, a
retail hedge fund should disclose basic information including informa-
tion about its management company, fees and redemption policy, and
risks and returns. 1 3 Another important feature of hedge funds is eco-
nomically significant co-investment by the hedge fund manager,
which aligns incentives between managers and investors.' 14
As is typical in foreign jurisdictions, hedge funds selling shares
to retail investors in the U.S. would probably take the form of a FOHF
operated by a large financial firm. First, hedge fund managers seem to
have little interest in managing capital from retail investors directly." 5
This may be in part due to a perception that retail investors are less
sophisticated or more risk-averse than institutional or wealthy individ-
uals and therefore are more likely to move their capital in and out of
funds-a practice hedge fund managers find very undesirable." 6
Hedge funds may also find retail investors undesirable because their
substantially smaller investments likely increase a fund's transaction
costs in raising, managing, and redeeming capital, and providing indi-
vidualized services to investors.' 1 7 Second, a FOHF's value is gener-
ally greatest to investors, such as retail investors, for whom investing
in several separate, single-strategy hedge funds would be too costly,
time-consuming, or complicated. 1 8 Furthermore, large financial
firms already running hedge funds for institutional investors, such as
113. For a discussion of the information likely required by sophisticated retail inves-
tors to make an informed investment choice, see infra Part III.B. 1. Because all state-
ments made to investors are subject to prohibitions on fraud, a hedge fund making
basic disclosures of information is less likely to engage in fraudulent activity than a
fund not making such disclosures. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing federal anti-fraud
law applicable to hedge funds).
114. See Agarwal et al., supra note 20, at 28-29.
115. Gradante Testimony, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that "Hennessee [Group LLC]
research indicates that hedge fund managers do not want to manager [sic] retail as-
sets"); FIN. SERVS. AuTH., HEDGE FUNDS AND THE FSA: FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON
DP16, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/programs/An-
nual0313.02.pdf (noting that responses to the U.K.'s inquiry regarding retail hedge
funds "have not suggested that there is a great desire among product providers or
retail investment advisers to produce and sell retail hedge fund products").
116. Helen Avery, The Funds of Hedge Funds That Are Too Hot to Handle,
EUROMONEY, Nov. 2006, at I (reporting that hedge funds are turning away FOHFs
who move capital in and out of funds relatively quickly).
117. See Email from Bruce Gibney & Alda Leu, Clarium Capital Management LLC,
to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-566.pdf (stating that "hedge funds are
generally available for open and frank discussion with investors at any time").
118. Andrew Ang et al., Do Funds-of-Funds Deserve Their Fees-on-Fees? 2-3 (Nov.
20, 2005) (unpublished paper, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=687274) ("For un-
skilled investors, funds-of-funds add value, even if their after-fee returns are lower
than the returns of hedge funds.").
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mutual fund complexes and investment banks, would be likely to cre-
ate retail FOHFs because they possess the necessary infrastructure and
marketing abilities to make selling shares to retail investors
economical." 19
Like hedge funds, FOHFs charge their own layer of management
and performance fees (averaging about 1.5% and 10% respectively),
employ high water marks and lockups, and may have managerial co-
investment. 20 FOHFs typically have greater access to hedge funds,
lower minimum investments, and provide investors with a portfolio
manager having expertise in the funds. 21 FOHFs do not typically en-
gage in derivatives trading or short-selling, but they do sometimes em-
ploy leverage.122 Although research finds that FOHFs are, in some
ways, less preferable to hedge funds because of their second layer of
fees, studies also find that FOHFs are better at diversifying portfolios
and, unlike hedge funds, may decrease their fees in response to com-
petitive pressures. 123
119. See Donald E. Lacey, Jr., Democratizing the Hedge Fund: Considering the Ad-
vent of Retail Hedge Funds 67-68 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished paper, available at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/donald-lacey.pdf). Indeed, in July of 2006,
the U.S.-based investment bank Goldman Sachs launched Goldman Sachs Dynamic
Opportunities Limited, a FOHF listed on the London Stock Exchange for retail inves-
tors. See Goldman Sachs homepage, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/client-services/
asset-management/closed endedinvestmentcompanies/resident.html (detailing
terms of fund).
120. See Ang et al., supra note 118, at 1, 15 (summarizing FOHF's fee structure and
use of high watermarks); HEWITT INV. GROUP, IN BRIEF: HEDGE FUND-OF-FUNDS-
PART ONE: STRATEGIC ALLOCATIONS 2 (2005), available at http://www.hewittinvest-
mentgroup.com/pdf/InBrief FundofFunds.pdf; Brett Duval Fromson, SOS for
FOFs: Funds of Hedge Funds Under Fire for Fees, Risks and Low Returns; Can
Managers Survive a Dry Spell? WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2007, http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB 116982933420289117.html (noting that because of managerial co-in-
vestment FOHF "managers likely have a piece of the action via the general
partnership").
121. DEUTSCHE BANK, FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MULTI-MAN-
AGER FUNDS 15, 18 (2000), available at http://www.opalesque.com/files/
FundsofHedgeFundsAnlntroductiontoMultiManagerFunds.pdf.
122. See, e.g., id. at 50-51 (finding that the Permal European Holdings FOHF uses
up to 20% leverage); HEWrIrT INV. GROUP, supra note 120, at 4.
123. Emily Denvir & Elaine Hutson, The Performance and Diversification Benefits
of Funds of Hedge Funds, 16 J. INT'L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 4, 5-6
(2006) (finding that FOHFs are better portfolio diversifiers than single-strategy hedge
funds); Maher Kooli, The Diversification Benefits of Hedge Funds and Funds of
Hedge Funds, 12 DERIVATIVES USE, TRADING & REG. 290, 299 (2007) (finding that
FOHFs provide added diversification); Christopher Holt, Hedge Fund Fees Show
Signs of Heading South, SEEKINGALPHA.COM, July 5, 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/
article/40106-hedge-fund-fees-show-signs-of-heading-south (citing research showing
that fees are decreasing for FOHFs).
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2. Retail Access to Hedge Fund-Like Investments
Several hedge fund-like alternatives have emerged in response to
investor demand for absolute return (or low market-correlation) strate-
gies without features such as low liquidity and substantial minimum
investment requirements. One development is public offerings of al-
ternative asset managers who sponsor hedge funds (and other invest-
ment vehicles such as private equity and real estate funds). On
February 8, 2007, Fortress Investment Group ("Fortress") was the first
U.S.-listed alternative asset management company to go public, rais-
ing $634 million in an initial public offering.' 24 Fortress is a regis-
tered investment adviser providing asset management services to its
underlying funds, which primarily include private equity funds, hedge
funds, and two publicly traded real estate investment vehicles. The
income of the public adviser entity comes from management fees, per-
formance fees, and investment income from the capital Fortress itself
invests into its funds. 125 Another hedge fund manager to allow retail
investors to share in its gains and losses is Och-Ziff Capital Manage-
ment Group, a registered investment adviser primarily managing
hedge funds. On July 2, 2007, Och-Ziff filed a registration statement
with the SEC as is required to publicly raise capital. 126
Another development is the growth of synthetic hedge funds (or
hedge fund "clones"), which are passively managed index-based se-
curities that attempt to replicate hedge fund returns through complex
trading algorithms. 127 Although most synthetic hedge funds are avail-
able only to high net worth investors, some will likely be available to
retail investors in a few years. 12 8 Yet another trend is the growth of
124. Alex Halperin, Investors Storm Fortress IPO, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Feb. 9,
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/feb2007/pi207O2O9_895342.
htm?chan=top+news-top+.
125. Fortress Inv. Group, Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 29 (Nov. 8, 2006).
126. Gregory Zuckerman, A Bustle Grows on Hedge Row: The IPO Allure, WALL
ST. J., July 3, 2007, at CI.
127. See Marc Hogan, Hedge Funds: Attack of the Clones, BUSINESSWEEK.COM,
Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/dec2006/pi2OO61204
627321.htm?chan=search; Harry M. Kat & Helder P. Palaro, Hedge Fund Returns:
You Can Make Them Yourself' 4-5 (City Univ. of London, Cass Bus. Sch., Alterna-
tive Inv. Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 0023, 2005) (suggesting how to create a
clone using a "general procedure that allows us to design simple trading strategies in
stock index, bond, currency and interest rate futures that generate returns with statisti-
cal properties that are very similar to those of hedge funds").
128. Jarvis, supra note 80, at 5 (reporting that "individual investors may find [syn-
thetic hedge fund clones] available in the retail market within three to five years");
Hogan, supra note 127 (noting that the Merrill Lynch synthetic "Factor index is cur-
rently unavailable in the retail market, though Merrill executives say they are consid-
ering wider distribution").
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hedged mutual funds, which are publicly registered investment com-
panies that mimic hedge fund strategies and only require an average
minimum investment of $5000, with some as low as $500.129 Hedge
fund clones and hedged mutual funds expose retail investors to the
same kinds of risks and complicated strategies as real hedge funds, 130
which means that increasing access to hedge funds will not expose
retail investors to entirely new types of risk or investment complexity.
In addition, some FOHFs have become more like mutual funds and
are publicly registered as investment companies. 13' Finally, with the
development of sophisticated at-home trading tools and publicly regis-
tered exchange traded funds (ETFs), retail investors can implement
hedge fund trading strategies on their own, at low cost. These compli-
cated strategies include: short-selling; trading options, futures, and
other derivatives; investing in gold, silver, and other commodities;
trading securities tied to foreign exchange rates and emerging markets;
and investing in ETFs whose value is tied to intangible assets such as
good will or innovation. 32 In addition, an ETF attempting to mimic
returns of a hedge fund clone is being planned by Stonebrook Struc-
tured Products and similar products are likely to follow.' 33
None of these alternatives possess all the characteristics of real
hedge funds, which likely explains why none have been able to cap-
ture the full benefits of hedge fund investing. Investing in shares of
publicly traded alternative asset managers may provide returns that are
less correlated with market returns, liquid shares, and substantial
transparency because such issuers must make disclosures mandated by
129. Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Funds for Retail Investors? An Examination of
Hedged Mutual Funds 1 (June 4, 2007) (unpublished paper, available at http:II
www.fma.org/Orlando/Papers/HMFJanuaryl lfma.pdf); Adam Shell, Investors Add
a Bit of Hedge Fund to Portfolio Mix, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2006, at B 1.
130. See Kat & Palaro, supra note 127, at 8 (noting that all of "the statistical [risk
and return] properties of [George Soros's Quantum hedge fund] .. have been quite
successfully replicated" by the authors' own synthetic hedge fund); Agarwal et al.,
supra note 129, at 13-14 (finding that hedged mutual funds open to retail investors
exhibit more extreme returns ("kurtosis") than traditional mutual funds); Shell, supra
note 129 ("While these new [hedged mutual] funds are sold under the guise of mutual
funds, it does not mean that the investment strategies they use are any less confusing
than a hedge fund.") (emphasis added).
131. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and Investor Protection Regulation, EcON.
REv., Fourth Quarter 2006, at 35, 44-45.
132. See Rob Wherry, These ETFs Bring Hedge-Fund Tactics to the Mainstream,
SMARTMONEY.COM, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.smartmoney.com/etffocus/
index.cfm?story=20070131; Eleanor Laise et al., Over Their Heads: Small Investors,
Too, Get Nailed by Arcane Trades, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2007, at Al.
133. Eleanor Laise, The Hedge-Fund 'Clones,' WALL ST. J., July 21, 2007, at BI.
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the securities laws. 134 However, retail investors do not gain the full
benefits of hedge fund investing by purchasing shares of publicly
traded fund managers. The shares of these investment advisers re-
present gains not to any particular hedge fund strategy, but to the en-
tire portfolio of investments and activities of the manager, which also
include other alternative investments such as private equity and real
estate funds. 135 Accordingly, investing in a public hedge fund man-
ager may dilute the gains from particular underlying funds.136 In addi-
tion, the disclosures made by a public hedge fund manager state
investment strategies in very general terms but do not reveal informa-
tion about any particular fund.' 37
The drawback of synthetic hedge funds is that they are not really
hedge funds in the sense of being portfolios of actively managed in-
vestments. Rather, they are computer simulations that mimic the pre-
vious performance of real hedge funds and, as such, are vulnerable to
failing to adjust to market developments as needed. 13 8 While clones
may outperform a large cross-section of hedge funds, they are gener-
ally unable to outperform the best hedge funds. 139 And while hedged
134. The registration statement of Och-Ziff, for example, details the value of operat-
ing company's equity and debt holdings and its short sales by sector and geographic
region. It also lists the value of its derivatives holdings and other assets and liabilities.
Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Group, Registration Statement, Amendment No. 6 (Form S-
1), at 110-12 (Oct. 25, 2007).
135. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 52, at 3 (noting that "[t]he underlying
earnings from these managers [such as Fortress] are not purely from hedge funds and
the securitisation of the earnings represents more an alternative assets earnings
stream").
136. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital 45-46 (Wayne State Univ. Law
Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-26, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.cornabstract=1012042 (arguing that the derivative nature of public hedge fund
managers make them "more risky on an individualized basis than the hedge fund and
private equity investments they substitute for").
137. For example, Och-Ziff's registration statement states only that one of its main
investment strategies includes "[ciredit and distressed credit investments, which in-
volves high-yield debt investments at a favorable price in distressed businesses ... 
See Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Group, supra note 134, at 170.
138. During the recent market losses stemming from the subprime market, hedge
funds heavily dependent upon automated quantitative trading techniques experienced
substantial losses. Katherine Burton & Jenny Strasburg, Highbridge, Goldman
'Quant' Hedge Funds Lose Money, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aEPgend5RgPk&refer=home,
("Hedge funds' quantitative, or 'quant,' models have been confounded by wider credit
spreads stemming from losses in the subprime loan market.").
139. See Jasmina Hasanhodzic & Andrew W. Lo, Can Hedge-Fund Returns Be Rep-
licated?: The Linear Case, 5 J. OF INVESTMENT MGMT. 5, 5, 19-20 (2007) (finding
that "the performance of linear clones is often inferior to their hedge-fund counter-
parts . . ." and "61% of the average total return is attributable to manager-specific
alpha [i.e., skill], implying that on average, the remaining 39% is due to" general
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mutual funds may outperform regular mutual funds, hedged mutual
funds have likewise been unable to match the performance of the best
hedge funds in part because of the substantially higher regulatory bur-
dens placed on publicly registered investment funds.' 40 Additionally,
FOHFs publicly registered as investment companies do not market to
retail investors because current law prohibits managers of such funds
from charging performance fees if they accept capital from retail in-
vestors. 141 Both hedged mutual funds and registered FOHFs are in-
dicative of the inherent deficiencies in using registered public
company structure to broaden access to hedge funds. 142 In sum, the
sophisticated retail investor seeking the full benefits of professionally
managed hedge fund products lacks direct access to genuine hedge
funds and their superior risk-adjusted returns.
II.
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS:
RETAIL VS. NON-RETAIL
The legal structure of the U.S. market for investment funds cre-
ates two tiers, within which retail investors have virtually no access to
hedge funds. The securities in one tier of investment funds are open
to all investors able to afford to purchase their shares. Securities of
funds in the other tier are only available for purchase by individuals
and institutions qualified based primarily upon net worth or some
other indicator of financial sophistication. U.S. securities laws and
regulations place no direct limitations on the ability of individual in-
vestors to invest in hedge funds. Hedge funds, on the other hand, can
only accept funds from limited numbers of wealthy investors in order
to qualify for exemptions from certain mandatory disclosure rules and
other laws restricting their conduct. Because hedge funds typically
find such exemptions beneficial, the funds almost exclusively sell
their securities to wealthy individuals and are inaccessible to retail
market movements); Hogan, supra note 127 ("Merrill [Lynch] doesn't claim the
[hedge fund] index can match the market-beating returns of the best-performing hedge
funds.").
140. See generally Agarwal et al., supra note 129, at 25-26 (finding that hedged
mutual funds underperform as compared to hedge funds but outperform traditional
mutual funds due to less regulatory constraints including investment flexibility).
141. For example, although the Oppenheimer Tremont Market Neutral Fund is a
registered investment fund which in 2002 had an investment minimum of $25,000; it
requires investors to have a net worth of $1.5 million so that it may utilize perform-
ance fees. Edwards, supra note 131, at 44-45. For discussion on prohibition of per-
formance fees, see infra notes 176-78, 217, and accompanying text.
142. The limitations placed upon registered investment companies that conflict with
hedge fund operations are discussed infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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investors. The choices hedge funds make in response to regulation
thus creates a two-tiered market.
A. Structure of the U.S. Market for Retail Investment Funds
The Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") subject compa-
nies that raise capital from the public (i.e., issuers of securities) and
have their securities widely traded to an extensive system of registra-
tion, disclosure, and reporting requirements. The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 (the "Company Act") and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act") subject investment companies and
investment advisers-those in the business of facilitating investment
in issuers-to an additional regime of registration, disclosure, and lim-
itations on activities such as investment strategies and fee struc-
tures. 143 Publicly traded pools of capital commonly referred to as
"mutual funds" are open to retail and non-retail investors and are
therefore required to comply with aspects of the four federal securities
laws. 144 These statutes each have their own provisions exempting va-
rious entities from registration and from most (but not all) disclosure
requirements, and it is within these exemptions that hedge funds are
typically structured and operate. 145
143. See Company Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l) (2000) (defining an invest-
ment company as an issuer that, among other things, "is or holds itself out as being
engaged primarily ... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading securities");
Advisers Act § 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000) (defining an investment
adviser as any person "in the business of advising others," including investment com-
panies, about whether to purchase or sell certain securities).
144. See SEC, INVEST WISELY: AN INTRODUCTION TO MUTUAL FUNDS (2007), http://
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm. A mutual fund is a registered investment
company "that pools money from many investors and invests the money in stocks,
bonds, short-term money-market instruments, other securities or assets, or some com-
bination of these investments." Mutual funds are classified under the Company Act as
open-end management companies. See id. ("Legally known as an 'open-end com-
pany,' a mutual fund is one of three basic types of investment companies."); Company
Act § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(3) (2000) (defining "management company"); Com-
pany Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000) (defining a management company
as "open-end" if it "is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of
which it is the issuer").
145. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 18-19, 21 (noting that a hedge fund
is a type of fund whose "interests are not sold in a registered public offering [under
the Securities Act] and which is not registered as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act," that the funds are not necessarily regulated as broker-
dealers or otherwise registered under the Exchange Act, and that "[m]any hedge fund
advisers .. avoid registering with the Commission by relying on the Advisers Act's
de minimis exemption under Part 203(b) of that Act").
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The Securities Act requires all companies publicly raising capital
to register with the SEC and disclose information to investors.' 46 Sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act requires all interstate issuers of securities
to file a registration statement. 147 Registration statements typically re-
lied upon by hedge funds generally consist of a prospectus to be deliv-
ered to investors before or accompanying a sale, other information to
be filed with the SEC, and a third category of information to be made
available to investors upon request. 48 The SEC has adopted several
different registration statements tailored to different types of issuers
such as investment companies, certain real estate companies, and for-
eign issuers. Form S-1 is the general form for use by issuers of stan-
dard U.S. securities, or those not qualifying to use any particularized
form, and requires disclosure of extensive financial and non-financial
information.' 49 Form S-1 requires the delivery of a prospectus con-
taining information such as a description of the issuer's business, the
offering, important risk factors affecting the issuer, financial state-
ments, and numerous items relating to the financial condition of the
issuer.150
The Exchange Act also requires companies to file a registration
statement and to periodically disclose financial and other information.
Section 12 of the Exchange Act requires registration of securities
traded on a national exchange.- 5' The Exchange Act also requires re-
gistration of large shareholdings of securities.- 52 Form 10 is the basic
registration form to be filed under the Exchange Act and requires dis-
closure of information similar to that required under Securities Act
registration forms.' 5 3 Section 13(a) requires Exchange Act registered
146. Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
147. Id.
148. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 145-57 (describing the components of dis-
closure for registration statement on Form N-1A and Form S-1).
149. Form S-i General Instruction I, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2007). None of the Securities Act registration forms are codi-
fied in the Code of Federal Regulations, but they can all be obtained from the SEC's
website.
150. Id.
151. Exchange Act § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any
member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security (other than an
exempted security) on a national securities exchange unless a registration is effective
as to such security for such exchange . .
152. See infra Part III.B.2.
153. See Form 10, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml0.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,
2008) (listing the types of information required to be disclosed in an Exchange Act
registration statement); LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES
LAW 110 (1998) (noting that "Exchange Act registration forms have much in common
with Securities Act registration forms, because there is great sameness in the general
disclosures required for registration under each Act").
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companies to comply with a panoply of periodic reporting require-
ments, including filing annual and quarterly reports on Forms 10-K,
10-Q, and occasional reports on Form 8-K. 154
In addition to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, invest-
ment fund business activities also implicate the Company Act and the
Advisers Act. The Company Act requires registration by all invest-
ment companies, defined as any issuer that, among other things, "is or
holds itself out as being engaged primarily . . . in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities."' 55 Registered invest-
ment companies are subject to their own extensive disclosure and re-
porting requirements including disclosure of audited financial
statements and the value and amount of the securities it owns.' 5 6
Open-end registered investment companies like mutual funds must
quarterly disclose portfolio holdings to the SEC 157 and semiannually
to investors. ' 58 Mutual funds must also daily calculate net asset value
and allow investors to redeem shares within seven days at that
value. 159 Furthermore, a registered investment company must have a
board of directors, 40% of whom are independent. 16°
A registered investment company is significantly limited in the
use of the investment strategies that distinguish hedge funds from
154. See Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000); Exchange Act Regulation
13A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2006) (covering the periodic filings required to be filed
under the Exchange Act); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 474-75 (4th ed. 2001) (describing disclosures on Forms 10-K, 10-
Q, and 8-K).
155. Company Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2000).
156. See LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 5:2.5.
157. See Company Act § 30(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(a)-(b) (2000); Company
Act Rules 30(a)-(b), 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-b (2007) (requiring registered investment
companies to file annual reports as required by the Exchange Act, and requiring regis-
tered investment companies to file semiannual or quarterly reports); Company Act
Rule 30bl-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-1 (2007) (requiring registered management in-
vestment companies to file annual and semi-annual reports on Form N-SAR within
sixty days after the close of the second quarter and fiscal year); Company Act Rule
30b1-5, 17 C.F.R. §270.30bl-5 (2007) (requiring registered management investment
companies to file a complete portfolio schedule on Form N-Q within sixty days after
its first and third quarters).
158. See Company Act § 30(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (2000); Company Act Rule
30e-1, 17 C.F.R. §270.30e-1 (2007).
159. Company Act § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2000); Company Act Rule 22c-
l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2007) (requiring registered investment companies to
sell, redeem, or repurchase shares at net asset value); Company Act Rule 22c-l(b), 17
C.F.R. § 270.22c-l(b) (2007) (requiring registered investment companies to calculate
net asset value at least daily).
160. Company Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000) ("No registered investment
company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of the members of
which are persons who are interested persons of such registered company.").
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other investment companies, such as the use of leverage, derivatives,
and short-selling.' 6' Under Section 18(f) of the Company Act, a reg-
istered investment company must cover bank borrowings by assets
equivalent to at least 300% of the borrowings and cannot issue any
class of securities senior to those held by shareholders. 162 SEC staff
interpretations of the Company Act also require a registered company
engaging in a short-sale and certain derivatives transactions to take an
offsetting long position in a segregated account.163 Registered invest-
ment companies are also prohibited from investing greater than 15%
of the net value of their assets in illiquid securities,' 64 which conflicts
with investment practices of some hedge funds. 165 Furthermore,
hedge fund lockup periods conflict with the general prohibition
against registered investment companies suspending redemption of
shares. 166 Limitations imposed by the Company Act on leverage and
investing in illiquid securities may also conflict with practices of a
FOHF if registered as an investment company. 167
The Advisers Act requires the registration of certain investment
advisers, defined as any person in the business of advising others, in-
cluding investment companies, about whether to purchase or sell cer-
tain securities.' 68 Investment advisers are required to register under
circumstances such as when the adviser holds himself out to the pub-
lic, has a registered investment company as a client, or has more than
fifteen clients. 169 Fund managers registered under the Advisers Act
must disclose information on Form ADV, either to investors or the
161. See generally Audrey C. Talley & James L. Love, Restrictions on Investments,
in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION § 8:1, (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2005).
162. Company Act § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000).
163. See Emerald Mgmt. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
502, at *2 (Jan. 21, 1978); LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 5:2.7. Although the SEC has
authority under Part 12(a) of the Company Act to prohibit registered investment com-
panies from undertaking short-sales or purchasing securities on the "margin" (which
is a form of borrowing), it has not exercised that authority.
164. See Talley & Love, supra note 161, § 8:3.6. The SEC defines "illiquid" securi-
ties as those that cannot be sold at or near their net asset value within seven days. Id.
165. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that hedge funds engage in a
wide variety of investment strategies which may involve investing in illiquid
securities).
166. See Company Act § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2000).
167. It should be noted that diversification requirements for registered investment
companies that could potentially be applicable to a registered fund of funds are only
applicable to investments in an "investment company" for which hedge funds do not
qualify. Company Act § 12(d)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1).
168. Advisers Act § 202(a)(1I), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l ) (2000).
169. See Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2000). A "client" for the
purposes of the Advisers Act is each individual fund, not each investor in the fund.
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SEC. 170 The items listed on Part II of Form ADV require a fund man-
ager to deliver to investors or prospective investors a brochure con-
taining several items about itself, including information about its
investment strategies, the background of its personnel, and its interest
in client transactions and brokerage arrangements. 17 Fund managers
registered under the Advisers Act must typically also disclose to in-
vestors material facts about the financial condition of the management
company potentially impairing its ability "to meet contractual commit-
ment to clients."' 72 In addition, investors or potential investors must
be made aware of facts relating to any legal or disciplinary event rele-
vant to the manager's integrity or ability to meet client commit-
ments.' 73 The items listed on Part IA of Form ADV must be
electronically filed with the SEC and consist of basic information such
as persons who control the manager and potential conflicts of inter-
est. 174 Fund managers registered with a state regulator also typically
complete and deliver Form ADV, and some states also require regis-
tered managers to file Part 11.175
Generally, a registered investment adviser cannot charge a per-
formance fee to investment companies it advises. 176 However, regis-
tered advisers may charge performance fees to a fund if all investors
in the fund meet the definition of "qualified client," which, in the case
of natural persons, means having a net worth of at least $1.5 mil-
lion.177 Determination of whether a client is qualified for the purposes
170. Advisers Act Rule 204-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(a) (2007) (requiring invest-
ment advisers registered or required to be registered under the Advisers Act to "fur-
nish each advisory client and prospective advisory client with a written disclosure
statement which may be either a copy of Part II of its form ADV which complies with
[Rule 204-1(b)] under the Act or a written document containing at least the informa-
tion then so required by Part II of Form ADV").
171. Form ADV, Part It, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2008).
172. Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-4(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-4(a)(1) (2007).
173. Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-4(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-4(a)(2) (2007).
174. Advisers Act Rule 203-1(b), 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1(b) (2007); Form ADV,
supra note 171.
175. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
176. See Advisers Act § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2000). A registered
investment adviser may, however, charge a "fulcrum fee" based upon assets under
management which is increased or decreased according to a relevant benchmark of
performance. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2). These fee arrangements are only utilized
by a small minority of mutual funds. See id.; Sophia Grene, A Cautious Embrace of
Performance Fees, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at 9 ("According to Lipper research, just
over 2 per cent of US mutual funds have such a [fulcrum] fee structure .... ).
177. Advisers Act Rule 205-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2007). To avoid this limita-
tion on charging performance fees, registered FOHFs do not accept capital from retail
investors. See Edwards, supra note 131, at 44-45.
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of charging a performance fee requires the adviser to "look-through"
to each individual equity owner in the advised fund. 178
B. Structure of the U.S. Market for Non-Retail Investment Funds
Hedge funds qualify for exemptions from the four federal securi-
ties laws listed above by limiting sales to only a certain number of
wealthy investors, not advertising or otherwise holding their services
out to the public, and also limiting resale of their securities.
1. Exemptions from the Securities Act
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act specifically exempts nonpublic
offerings of securities by an issuer from the requirements of Section
5.179 These sales are widely referred to as "private placements" or
"private offerings."' 180 However, the Securities Act does not define
the meaning of "public offering" or provide any criteria by which to
distinguish private from public offerings. The seminal case on the
definition of "public offering" is the 1953 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., which held the company's offer
and sale of unregistered stock to a broad range of employees to be a
public offering. 18 1 Under Ralston, an offering is nonpublic if offerees
are "able to fend for themselves," and such is the case where offerees
have access to "the same kind of information the Act would make
available in the form of a registration statement."' 182 Following Ral-
ston, federal courts have taken varying approaches and found several
elements inherent in or indicative of a section 4(2) nonpublic offering.
These elements include that the offerees have access to or receipt of
registration statement-like information, are financially sophisticated,
and have the ability to bear economic risk. 183
Notwithstanding substantial case law on point, a statutory section
4(2) nonpublic offering lacks a precise and widely-accepted judicial
definition. To decrease the uncertainty involved with section 4(2) of-
ferings and thereby expand the market for private placements, the SEC
178. See Advisers Act Rule 205-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b) (2007); SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 2, at 61 n.212.
179. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000) (exempting from Part 5 of the
Securities Act any "transaction not involving a public offering").
180. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
181. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953).
182. Id. at 125-26.
183. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 116-20. An offering is also less likely
to be deemed "public" if the offering is personally made to potential investors, raises a
low amount of capital, and involves a small group of offerees and limited number of
shares. Id.
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engaged in a series of rulemakings culminating in Regulation D. 184
Rule 506 of Regulation D is a nonexclusive safe harbor providing ob-
jective criteria by which an issuer can assure itself of exemption from
the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act. 185 To
avoid the uncertainty involved in making a statutory section 4(2) pri-
vate placement and to minimize liability in connection with making a
nonpublic offering, hedge funds usually make private offerings under
the requirements of Rule 506 and according to the judicially-defined
statutory section 4(2) exemption. 186 This means that nominally pri-
vate hedge funds disclose to investors information of the type dis-
closed in a Securities Act registration statement. 187
Pursuant to Rule 506, a fund may sell an unlimited number of
securities to accredited investors and not be subject to the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements of section 5.188 An "accredited
investor" is a qualified financial institution or natural person, or one
the fund reasonably believes is qualified.' 89 Rule 506 itself imposes
no affirmative disclosure obligations upon a hedge fund making an
offering solely to accredited investors. For a natural person to qualify
as an accredited investor, the sole criterion is possession of the requi-
site level of wealth. A natural person whose net worth (or whose joint
net worth with a spouse) exceeds $1,000,000 qualifies as an accredited
investor.' 90 A natural person can also qualify as an accredited inves-
tor if the investor has an annual income for the last two years of
$200,000 (or $300,000 in joint spousal income if married) with a rea-
184. See Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 403-04.
185. Id. at 404.
186. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 120 ("Hedge funds typically rely on the safe
harbor of Regulation D Rule 506... in addition to relying on the statutory section
4(2) exemption, in offering and selling their interests."); LEDERMAN, supra note 20,
§ 4:2.1 (noting that hedge funds typically raise capital "pursuant to a private place-
ment exempted from registration under section 4(2) of the Securities Act and Rule
506 of Regulation D"); SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 153, at 73 (noting the
importance of the section 4(2) private placement exemption even in light of Rule 506
because, among other reasons, it minimizes liability for making an unregistered public
offering).
187. The disclosures typically made by hedge funds are discussed in detail in Part
lMI.B.2.
188. See Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007) (stating offers and
sales under certain conditions "shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any
public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the [Securities] Act."). Al-
though Rule 506(b)(2)(i) limits the number of "purchasers" allowed to thirty-five, that
limitation has no effect because accredited investors are not included in the definition
of "purchaser" under Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (2007).
189. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007).
190. Id. § 230.501(a)(5).
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sonable expectation of reaching the same in the current year.' 9' On
December 27, 2006, the SEC proposed new rule 509, raising the level
of personal wealth required for individuals to qualify to purchase se-
curities offered by certain hedge funds and other private investment
funds (such as private equity funds). 192 The proposed rule is applica-
ble only to investment funds relying on exclusion from the definition
of investment company provided by section 3(c)(1) of the Company
Act 193 and, for that reason, do not impact the reforms proposed in this
Article. 194 The proposed rule adds the requirement that individuals
purchasing securities from 3(c)(1) funds must, in addition to being
accredited, also qualify as an "accredited natural person," which re-
quires owning at least $2.5 million in investments.1 95
Rule 506 does allow sale to up to thirty-five nonaccredited inves-
tors so long as the investor is financially sophisticated or the hedge
fund believes the investor to be so. 196 Financial sophistication means
that an investor, either alone or with the assistance of a purchaser rep-
resentative, possesses "such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investment."'' 97 However, a sale to any
nonaccredited investors requires the fund, at a reasonable time before
the sale, to furnish financial and non-financial information to investors
"material to an understanding of the issuer, its business and the securi-
ties being offered."' 198 A hedge fund selling to accredited and nonac-
credited investors must make the same disclosures to both groups to
avoid violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and
other federal securities laws. 199
191. Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
192. See Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 405.
193. Id. The SEC also proposed rule 216 applicable to section 3(c)(1) funds seeking
exemption from section 4(6) of the Securities Act. Id. Since hedge funds typically do
not raise capital pursuant to section 4(6), rule 216 is not discussed in this Article.
194. See infra Part IV.A-B.
195. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 405.
196. Regulation D, Rule 506(b)(2)(i)-(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2007).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2007).
198. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (2007). This information is similar to
the type required in Part I of a registration statement, must be more extensive the
larger the offering, and requires employment of an independent auditor for offerings
over $2,000,000. See id.
199. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2007) ("When an issuer provides in-
formation to [nonaccredited] investors pursuant to paragraph (b)(1), it should consider
providing such information to accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws."); SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007) ("If a company pro-
vides information to accredited investors, it must make this information available to
non-accredited investors as well.").
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To qualify for an exemption under Rule 506, a hedge fund is also
prohibited from offering or selling its securities using "general solici-
tation or general advertising. ' '2°° Rule 502(c) of Regulation D lists
any advertising in print or broadcast media and any invitation to a
seminar or meeting by such methods as constituting general solicita-
tion or advertising.20' Hedge funds should have a reasonable basis for
believing potential investors are accredited or otherwise financially
sophisticated. 20 2 For example, the SEC found that a broker-dealer
made a general solicitation when it sent out a mass email about pri-
vately raising capital for an Internet startup, without first verifying
whether the potential investors were accredited or otherwise
sophisticated. 20 3
Hedge funds that seek to fall within the safe harbor provision of
Rule 506 must also take steps to prevent the resale of their securities.
Securities purchased pursuant to a Rule 506 private placement cannot
be resold by the purchaser without registration or qualification for an-
other exemption. 2°4 The hedge fund must exercise reasonable care to
prevent resales, which may be demonstrated by inquiring as to
whether the purchaser is an underwriter with the intent to resell and
making clear in writing to investors of their inability to resell without
registering under the Securities Act.20 5
2. Exemptions from the Exchange Act, Company Act, and Advisers
Act
In addition to the Securities Act, hedge funds also operate so as
to be exempt from the disclosure and reporting provisions of the Ex-
change Act. A hedge fund does not have to register its securities
under section 12 of the Exchange Act and be subject to the periodic
reporting requirements of section 13, so long as it has fewer than 500
investors or no more than $10 million in assets as of the end of its
200. Regulation D, Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c) & 506(b)(1) (2007).
201. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1) (2007).
202. See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); HAMMER ET AL., supra note
16, at 122-23.
203. See In re CGI Capital, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7904 (Sept. 29, 2000).
204. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2007) (stating that "securities acquired
in a transaction under Regulation D shall have the status of securities acquired in a
transaction under section 4(2) of the [Securities] Act and cannot be resold without
registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom").
205. Id. Exercising reasonable care to prevent resale is meant "to assure that the
purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section
[2(a)(1 1)] of the [Securities] Act." Id.
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most recent fiscal year. 20 6 However, all hedge funds are subject to
certain reporting requirements under the Exchange Act relating to dis-
closure of significant holdings.20 7
Because hedge funds are in the business of investing in or trading
securities, they would fall within the definition of "investment com-
pany" under the Company Act if not for the fact that they typically
rely upon one of two exclusions from the definition of investment
company. Under section 3(c)(1) of the Company Act, hedge funds are
excluded from the definition of investment company as long as they
have no more than 100 investors and sell their securities only through
a private placement. 20 8 Under section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act,
hedge funds are excluded from the definition of investment company
as long as they only sell securities to "qualified purchasers" through a
private placement.20 9 A natural person satisfies the definition of
"qualified purchaser" under the Company Act if they own at least $5
million in investments.210 Section 3(c)(7) funds may sell to an unlim-
ited number of qualified purchasers without falling within the defini-
tion of an investment company but limit their sales to 499 investors so
as not to be required to register under section 12 of the Exchange
Act.21' The latter two provisions are the subject of the regulatory re-
forms proposal below.212
Finally, hedge fund managers meet the definition of "investment
adviser" under the Advisers Act.21 3 However, most fund managers
are exempt from registration because they qualify as small advisers.
To qualify as a small adviser, hedge fund managers must, among other
things, only provide investment advisory services to fewer than fifteen
clients, not hold themselves out to the public as advisers, and not pro-
vide advisory services to a registered investment company. 21 4 A "cli-
ent" includes a legal organization, thereby allowing hedge fund
206. See Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C § 781(g) (2000); Exchange Act Rule 12g-
1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2007). Hedge funds also typically do not need to register as
broker-dealers under the Exchange Act. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
207. See infra Part III.B.2.
208. Company Act § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000).
209. Company Act § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000). Nonpublic offerings
for the purposes of being exempted from the Company Act are generally interpreted
to be the same as those under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. SEC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 2, at 12 n.36.
210. Company Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i) (2000); Company Act
Rule 2a51-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(g)(2) (2007) (explaining how to calculate a nat-
ural person's level of investments for the purposes of being a qualified purchaser).
211. See Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C § 781(g) (2000).
212. See infra Part IV.A-B.
213. See Advisers Act § 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2000).
214. Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
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managers to count each separate fund as a client and not each separate
investor in each fund.215 Unregistered managers are generally not
subject to any limitations on charging performance fees.216 In addi-
tion, even registered investment advisers to section 3(c)(7) funds are
not subject to limitations on charging a performance fee.217
III.
How WEALTH-BASED QUALIFICATIONS HARM INVESTORS
Predicating exemptions from the Securities Act and Company
Act upon the wealth of investors is intended to further the goal of
investor protection. However, this approach actually undermines in-
vestor protection. Wealth-based qualifications effectively prohibit so-
phisticated retail investors from using hedge funds to reduce their risk
of loss and do not protect unsophisticated investors from bearing the
risks or investment complexity associated with hedge fund investing.
A. Rationales for Limiting Hedge Funds Only to Wealthy Investors
The rationales for limiting hedge funds to wealthy investors stem
from the fundamental purpose of securities law, which is to protect
investors from being fleeced by companies issuing securities and se-
curities traders. The legislative history of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act demonstrates that Congress was concerned with ordi-
nary investors being subjected to inadequate disclosure, fraud, and
manipulation of stock prices.218 Nearly every provision in the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act has the goal of protecting individual
investors from unscrupulous issuers.219 The securities laws seek to
protect investors by mandating a wide-ranging and detailed regime of
disclosure and reporting on issuers and holding issuers liable for fraud
in connection with such disclosures. The Securities Act seeks "to pro-
vide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities" sold by
issuers to raise capital. 220 The Exchange Act mandates disclosure and
215. Advisers Act Rule 203(b)(3)-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a) (2007).
216. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 333.
217. Advisers Act § 205(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(4) (2000) (exempting Company
Act 3(c)(7) funds from limiting performance fees for registered investment advisers
only to qualified clients).
218. C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 6 DUKE L. J. 1081, 1133 (1988).
219. See id. at 1134.
220. See Securities Act, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74, 73d Cong. (1933). There is little
controversy over the purposes of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 73-
47, at 1 (1933) (noting that the "basic policy [of the Securities Act] is that of inform-
ing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate
and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresenta-
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periodic reporting to prevent abusive trading practices and facilitate
accurate valuation of securities through secondary markets. 22' The
Company Act and Advisers Act likewise employ disclosure to protect
investors.222
Because the disclosure system seeks to protect investors from be-
ing misled by issuers, exemptions from the system are allowed when
mandatory disclosure is unnecessary for investors to make informed
investment choices. This approach is evident in the context of exemp-
tions from the Securities Act, which are allowed when an issuer is
offering securities to investors who do not need the protections of
mandatory disclosure because they can "fend for themselves. 223
Fending for oneself means possessing enough knowledge about the
issuer and financial sophistication to make an informed investment
decision. 224 Thus, registration and disclosure under the Securities Act
is unnecessary when potential investors have access to or are fur-
nished with the same kind of information made available under a re-
tion."); Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124 ("The design of the [Securities Act] is
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions.").
221. See Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 226 (1959) (arguing that
periodic reporting under the Exchange Act "is an essential part of the effort to remedy
abuses in exchange trading" because "the absence of public disclosure of the facts
facilitates manipulation, speculation on inside information, and other improper prac-
tices"); John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson MacChesney, The Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 32 MIcH. L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1934) (noting that the Exchange Act
disclosure requirements facilitate "evaluation of prices of securities"). In addition to
disclosure and fraud liability, the Exchange Act also expressly prohibits manipulative
and abusive trading practices by insiders, speculators, and others. See Exchange Act
§§ 8-11, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78h-j, 78p (2000).
222. See Company Act § l(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1) (2000); Goldstein v. SEC,
451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining that the purpose of the Advisers Act is
to "'substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor' in
the investment advisory profession") (quoting SEC. v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); Loomis, supra note 221, at 245 (noting the
registration and disclosure requirements of the Advisers Act sought to provide "a
compulsory census of investment advisers and which would provide in a small degree
for the regulation of some of their activities") (internal quotations omitted).
223. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125-27 ("An offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public
offering.' . . . The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the
protections afforded by registration.").
224. Id. at 124-26 (holding that "the exemption [from the Securities Act] question
turns on the knowledge of the offerees"); SEC v. Manus, et al., 1981 WL 1683
(S.D.N.Y.), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P98,307, at *6 (noting that under Ralston, the offerees
in a private offering should have the ability to evaluate the merits of the issue and be
disclosed information about the issuer like that disclosed in a registration statement).
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gistration statement.2 25 Consistent with this approach is the carve-out
for nonaccredited investors under Rule 506, which allows sale to up to
thirty-five sophisticated nonaccredited investors, provided that mate-
rial information about the company and the securities is provided
before the sale.2 2 6
In contrast to exemptions based upon actual investor knowledge
and sophistication, the two most important exemptions relied upon by
hedge funds use investor wealth as the sole criterion to be exempt
from mandatory disclosure.2 27 Rule 506 enables a hedge fund to be
exempt from the Securities Act and not have to disclose any informa-
tion to prospective investors as long as they are accredited investors.
Similarly, under section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act, investment com-
panies are not required to register or disclose information as long as
they limit their sales to qualified purchasers.2 28 Both of these exemp-
tions are based upon the assumption that wealth is an indication of the
ability to make informed investment choices.2 29
In proposing to increase the level of wealth required to qualify as
an accredited investor under Regulation D, SEC staff articulated how
wealth-based qualifications specifically apply to hedge fund invest-
ing.2 30 After recognizing that substantially more investors became
qualified to invest in hedge funds since the definition of accredited
investor was first established in 1982, the SEC expressed concern that
225. See Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125-26.
226. See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b)(1), 230.506(b)(2) (2007). See
supra text accompanying note 198.
227. Fletcher, supra note 218, at 1123 ("Rule 506 thus departs from the Ralston
Purina line of cases. Whereas before, private placement purchasers had to be smart,
now they need only be rich.").
228. Rule 506 and Company Act section 3(c)(7) do not require disclosure, but hedge
funds operating pursuant to such provisions nonetheless make comprehensive disclo-
sures to investors pursuant to other provisions of the federal securities laws. See infra
Part III.B.2.
229. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 404 (noting that the level of
wealth or income required to qualify as an accredited investor under Rule 506 is based
on the SEC's view that such levels meet the "goal of ensuring that only such persons
who are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of an investment in private offer-
ings may invest in one"); S. REP. No. 104-293, at 10 (1996) ("The qualified pur-
chaser pool [for 3(c)(7) funds] reflects the Committee's recognition that financially
sophisticated investors are in a position to appreciate the risks associated with invest-
ment pools that do not have the Investment Company Act's protections. Generally,
these investors can evaluate on their own behalf matters such as the level of a fund's
management fees, governance provisions, transactions with affiliates, investment risk,
leverage, and redemption rights.").
230. Although the proposed rules apply to various types of private investment funds,
the SEC's accompanying release reflects a primary concern with hedge funds. See
Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 400 n.3, 404 n.42, 404 n.43.
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more recently qualified investors "may find it difficult to appreciate
the unique risks" of hedge funds. 231 The SEC claimed that hedge
funds use "complicated investment strategies," and "minimal informa-
tion about [the funds is] available in the public domain" such that
"investors may not have access to the kind of information provided
through our system of securities registration. '232 From the SEC's
point of view, hedge funds "have become increasingly complex and
involve risks not generally associated with many other issuers of se-
curities." 233 As a result of the SEC's beliefs regarding minimal infor-
mation, increased complexity, and unique risks being associated with
hedge funds, it concluded that investors may fail to appreciate the
risks of hedge funds relating to issues such as "undisclosed conflicts
of interest, complex fee structures and the higher risk that may accom-
pany such pools' anticipated returns. '234 Accordingly, the SEC pro-
posed Rule 509 to increase the net worth required to invest in hedge
funds and ensure that each individual hedge fund investor "has a level
of knowledge and financial sophistication and the ability to bear the
economic risk of the investment in such pools. '235 In particular, the
$2.5 million in investments qualification is supposed to be
consistent with [the SEC's] goal of providing an objective and clear
standard to use in ascertaining whether a purchaser of a private
investment vehicle's securities is likely to have sufficient knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters to enable that
purchaser to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective invest-
ment, or to hire someone who can.236
Under the federal securities laws, therefore, wealthy investors are
deemed able to make informed choices about hedge funds because,
even if they do not, in fact, possess sufficient financial acumen, they
are able to purchase the services of those with financial sophistication,
or at least bear the losses from poor investment choices.




235. Id. It should be noted that proposed Rule 509 only applies to investments in
hedge funds exempt from the Company Act under section 3(c)(1) and not 3(c)(7).
The SEC's rationale was that natural persons investing in 3(c)(7) funds were already
required to own $5 million in investable assets to be a qualified purchaser to invest
and hence did not need the added protections of Rule 509. Id.
236. Id. at 405.
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B. Deficiencies in Limiting Hedge Funds
Only to Wealthy Investors
The financial acumen of retail investors likely to invest in hedge
funds and the disclosure practices typical of the funds indicate that
such investors are well-positioned to benefit from hedge fund invest-
ing. Broadening access would almost certainly not lead unsophistica-
ted retail investors to begin investing in the funds. In any case, all
retail investors can already expose themselves to risks and complexi-
ties similar to that of hedge funds merely by investing in registered
investment companies and other public companies with complex busi-
ness operations. Limiting hedge funds to wealthy investors therefore
prohibits sophisticated retail investors from earning the highest returns
on investment risks the law already permits them to bear.
1. Sophistication of Likely Retail Hedge Fund Investors
In determining whether retail investors possess sufficient invest-
ment sophistication to make informed choices about hedge funds, the
relevant group to focus on is retail investors already investing in tradi-
tional investments and likely to express a demand for and willingness
to undertake the steps to invest in the funds. The relevant group is not
the entire population of potential retail investors in the United States,
half of whom make no or little investments in stocks of any kind.237
Unsophisticated retail investors are highly unlikely to express a de-
mand for hedge funds, much less undertake the effort to invest in the
funds. This is because research finds that retail investors are typically
risk averse, fail to properly diversify their portfolios, and biased to-
wards investing in companies they are familiar with, even when doing
so undermines their economic interests. 238 The difficulty of retail
hedge funds in attracting investors in foreign jurisdictions such as Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong also provides some indication that unsophisti-
cated investors would not make substantial investments into hedge
237. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 2000 INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 64 (finding
that nearly 50% of U.S. households have invested in stocks).
238. See H. Henry Cao et al., Fear of the Unknown: The Effects of Familiarity on
Financial Decisions 6-7, 33-34 (Sept. 16, 2003) (unpublished paper, available at
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/areas/finance/papers/familiarityO9-08-03.pdf) (finding
evidence indicating that individuals prefer familiar investments); Warren Bailey et al.,
Home Bias of U.S. Individual Investors: Causes and Consequences 18 (Apr. 22, 2006)
(unpublished paper, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=633902) (finding that less
sophisticated and wealthy investors display bias towards home country stocks despite
the benefits of international diversification).
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funds.239 Accordingly, increased access to hedge funds is highly un-
likely to induce retail investors to invest in funds they know little
about when they currently fail to utilize the vast array of widely publi-
cized and low-cost opportunities (e.g., mutual funds, ETFs) already
open to them.
Retail hedge funds would likely be operated by major financial
institutions that have little incentive to market or sell their shares with
promises of exorbitant returns to appeal to uninformed investors.240
Although there is the possibility that unsophisticated investors might
invest in hedge funds, because of the risk and complexity of many
public companies, the availability of hedge fund-like investments, and
the ability of retail investors to engage in numerous complex trading
strategies on their own, retail hedge funds would not meaningfully add
to retail investors' already limitless opportunities to take on risks
above their level of financial sophistication.2 4'
By contrast, retail investors undertaking steps to invest in hedge
funds are likely to possess the requisite sophistication. Surveys of re-
tail investors find that 72% understand the tradeoff between risk and
return and 80% seek to diversify their portfolios.242 And because ob-
taining the services of a sophisticated purchaser representative will
likely lead an investor to make informed investment choices, retail
investors interested in hedge funds can likely purchase the requisite
sophistication due to the widespread availability of retail investment
advisers through firms such as John Hancock, Charles Schwab, and
Morgan Stanley. 243 Accordingly, a substantial portion of retail inves-
239. See Michael Ferguson, Ernst & Young, Hedge Funds Entering the "Mass-Mar-
ket" Arena: Funds Europe, Feb. 2004, at 1 (on file with the New York University
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy) (predicting based upon the experience of
Singapore and Hong Kong the demand for retail hedge funds in Europe will be "dis-
appointing"); Hedge Funds Flock to Hong Kong, TDCTRADE.COM, Dec. 2005, availa-
ble at http://banking.tdctrade.com/suc-e481.htm (reporting that Sally Wong,
Executive Director of the Hong Kong Investment Funds Association "thinks it will
take some time for retail investors to warm to hedge funds").
240. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
241. On the risk and complexity of registered public companies, see infra Part
III.B.4. On the availability and complexity of hedge fund-like investments, see supra
Part I.D.2. Because the reforms proposed here require the operator of a trading plat-
form for retail hedge funds to permit only sophisticated investors to trade, the poten-
tial for unsophisticated investors to invest in the funds is negligible.
242. APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, NASD INVESTOR LITERACY RE-
SEARCH 8 (2003) (finding that 72% of surveyed investors "knew that riskier invest-
ments yield higher returns over time than less risky investments"); Hartford Survey
Finds Eight Out of Ten Americans Keen on Asset Allocation, PR NEWSWIRE, July 8,
2004 (finding 80% of investors sought to diversify their portfolios).
243. Such firms typically charge investors a fee totaling a percentage of the inves-
tor's assets. See, e.g., Charles Schwab, Representatives' Compensation, http://
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tors are in a position to benefit from hedge fund investing, far greater
than the estimated 8.47% of U.S. households (which includes single
and married individuals) currently permitted to invest due to wealth-
based qualifications.2 44 Furthermore, wealthy individuals and institu-
tional investors are hesitant to invest in hedge funds until they have a
sufficient understanding of the funds' investment strategies and asso-
ciated risks. 245 This suggests that retail investors are likewise unlikely
to purchase hedge fund securities until and unless they have sufficient
familiarity with the funds' strategies and risks to make an informed
investment decision.2 46
Financial sophistication is not merely a matter of an investor's
business acumen in the abstract. As Regulation D correctly recog-
nizes, an investor is financially sophisticated when the investor, either
alone or with the assistance of a purchaser representative, has "such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective invest-
ment" under consideration. 247 Sophistication is therefore also a func-
tion of the quality of information disclosed about the issuer, either by
the issuer itself or a third party information provider. The more under-
standable and relevant information is disclosed, the more "capable of
evaluating" is the investor.
The law recognizes that investors with relatively little financial
expertise can be "sophisticated." Rule 506 recognizes that employ-
ment of a sophisticated purchaser representative deems an otherwise
unsophisticated investor qualified for the purposes of taking part in a
private placement.2 48 Furthermore, in Bayoud v. Ballard, the court
found physicians who successfully operated and sold their own medi-
cal clinic to be financially sophisticated for the purposes of a private
placement under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act where "the factual
www.aboutschwab.com/about/overview/compensation.html (last visited Jan. 13,
2008).
244. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 406.
245. See Joseph Finora, Hedge Funds Don't Sell Themselves, FINANCIAL-PLAN-
NING.COM, http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/wealth-adviser/20050310101.
html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (reporting that one hedge fund manager found that in
marketing to wealthy individuals "the greatest challenges facing those trying to mar-
ket hedge funds is providing a basic explanation of what's behind the product");
BANK OF N.Y. & CASEY, QUIRK & Assocs., supra note 51, at 4 (finding that in-
creased allocations to hedge funds by institutions is the result of increased comfort
with their trading strategies).
246. See Cao et al., supra note 238, at 6-7, 33-34 (finding that individuals avoid
investments that are unfamiliar).
247. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2007).
248. See id.; Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (2007) (defining "purchaser
representative").
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equivalency of a prospectus" was disclosed to them.249 The law af-
fords greater weight to disclosure for the purposes of purchasing unre-
gistered securities, likely in part because financial sophistication is a
relatively vague concept. The court in Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt.
Corp. held that so long as information material to making an informed
investment decision is provided to offerees, it may not even be neces-
sary to inquire into financial sophistication to establish a private place-
ment exemption. 250
Financial sophistication is therefore measured by a sliding scale,
consisting of an investor's financial acumen and the quality of infor-
mation provided about the issuer: the higher the quality of informa-
tion about the issuer, the less knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters an investor needs to be sophisticated; and vice
versa. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this approach. On the verti-
cal axis is the quality of disclosures made about the issuer. "Quality"
refers not only to how much and how often information about the
issuer is disclosed, but also how easy it is to understand, how relevant
it is to investment choice, and how accurate it is from an accounting
point of view. On the horizontal axis is an investor's level of techni-
cal knowledge and experience in business and financial matters. Each
point along curve S, represents a different type of sophisticated inves-
tor, reflecting the combination of financial acumen and quality of dis-
closure required to make an informed investment choice. A retail
investor interested in hedge funds likely understands the risk/return
tradeoff and the benefits of portfolio diversification, and to make an
informed investment choice requires relatively high quality disclo-
sures in terms of being easily understandable and material to the risks
involved with the issuer and its securities.
Figure 3 also illustrates an institutional FOHF manager, who pos-
sesses investment skills superior to a retail investor and can make in-
formed investment choices without standardized and easily readable
information about the issuer. Finally, a trader employed by a hedge
249. Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417, 423-24 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
250. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902-03, 902 n.10 (5th Cir.
1977) ("We do not intimate that evidence of the offerees' sophistication is required in
all cases to establish a private offering exemption under § 4(2)" of the Securities Act,
which solely requires a "sufficient basis of accurate information upon which the so-
phisticated investor may exercise his skills."). Indeed, post-Ralston jurisprudence
correctly recognizes that even the most astute investor cannot make an informed
choice if the issuer fails to disclose sufficient information about itself. Id. at 902
(finding that investor "[s]ophistication is not a substitute for access to the information
that registration would disclose"); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1290 (4th Cir.
1978) ("In short, there must be sufficient basis of accurate information upon which the
sophisticated investor may exercise his skills.").
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fund likely requires the lowest quality information about issuers to
make informed investment choices. A hedge fund trader may, for in-
stance, apply complex financial models to large bodies of risk and
return data to form their own proprietary knowledge about an
issuer.251
FIGURE 3: THE RANGE OF SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS
disclosures by a typical hedge fund






Knowledge and experience in financial and business matters.
Based on the goal and analysis of portfolio diversification
presented in Part I.C, a retail investor needs to have the following
information presented in an accessible manner to be able to fend for
himself in purchasing or selling a security. 252 First, a retail investor
should know how the security performed historically and the absolute
level of risk or volatility of the security. These two pieces of informa-
tion let the investor know how good an indicator past returns are of
future returns and thereby form an estimate of expected future returns.
Second, the investor should know how the security's returns are re-
lated to market trends and to what specific market risk factors the
security may be exposed. These items allow the investor to diversify
his or her portfolio. Finally, the investor should know the price at
which the security can be sold on a timely basis. All things being
equal, the greater the liquidity of the security-the ability to trade on a
short-term basis at net asset value-the better off is the investor.
251. For example, a common type of trading strategy known as "statistical arbitrage"
uses quantitative models in deciding what stocks to buy or sell-short. See ARMELLE
GUIZOT, THE HEDGE FUND COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDE 11 (2007).
252. A similar standard for investors in private pools such as hedge funds was enun-
ciated by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. See AGREEMENT
AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES RE-
GARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL 2 (2007), available at http:H/www.treasury.gov/
press/releases/reports/hp272_principles.pdf.
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In the context of retail investors making informed choices about
hedge fund issuers, a substantial majority of retail investors taking the
necessary steps to invest in hedge funds would likely be sufficiently
sophisticated. First, a retail investor interested in hedge funds is likely
to understand that higher expected returns tend to come with higher
risk and will likely attempt to further diversify his or her portfolio.253
Second, as discussed in detail in the next two subsections, the disclo-
sure practices currently utilized by hedge funds and third parties are
sufficient to allow such an investor to make an informed choice.
These disclosures are at a level illustrated by Dl in Figure 3.
Importantly, to be sufficiently sophisticated to make informed in-
vestment choices, it is not necessary to precisely understand the
mechanics of a company's day-to-day operations. Just as it is not nec-
essary to understand the intricacies of modem finance or medical
equipment innovation to make informed investment decisions regard-
ing publicly traded companies like Goldman Sachs or Medtronic, re-
spectively, it is not necessary for retail investors to have anything
beyond a basic understanding of derivatives, short-sales, and hedge
fund investing strategies to make informed choices about purchasing
the securities of the funds. Indeed, too much disclosure about hedge
fund operations may mislead and confuse investors who are unable to
properly interpret the information. 254 Sophisticated institutional in-
vestors, for instance, rarely desire hedge funds to disclose information
about their specific positions and instead are able to make informed
decisions so long as risk factors and information of the type mentioned
above are disclosed.2 55 Similarly, sophisticated retail investors should
be able to make informed investment choices without possessing in-
depth and detailed knowledge of the activities of the funds they invest
in.
253. See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, supra note 242, at 8.
254. See Bernanke, supra note 74 (rejecting the notion that regulators should attempt
to create a real-time database to track hedge fund investments because of the impracti-
cability of regulators gathering and interpreting vast amounts of financial data).
255. See EDHEC-Risk Asset Mgmt. Research, What Institutions Really Want from
Hedge Funds/Funds of Funds, May 31, 2007, http://www.edhec-risk.com/lat-
estnews/featured analysis/RISKArticle.2007-05-31.2202 (noting that only a small
proportion of institutions desire transparency at the position level); BANK OF N.Y. &
CASEY, QUIRK & Assocs., supra note 51, at 10.
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2. Hedge Fund Disclosure Practices
Hedge funds are widely regarded as highly opaque investment
vehicles. 256 This is a misunderstanding. Although hedge funds are
not subject to all of the registration and reporting requirements of the
federal securities laws and benefit from proprietary trading strategies,
as a matter of law and practice the funds make substantial and detailed
disclosures. As the industry becomes more prominent and institution-
alized and competition for investors grows, hedge funds are likely to
further expand and standardize disclosures to avoid liability and to
meet investor demand. The involvement of retail investors with hedge
funds would likely intensify such trends because the potential value of
their business would increase the value of expanding and standard-
izing disclosures.
Mandatory disclosure by hedge funds arises from the requirement
that all investment funds must comply with the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. Funds engaging in a private placement
pursuant to section 4(2) and Regulation D are subject to liability for
fraud under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Advisers
Act.257 These statutes prohibit specific material misstatements, fraud-
ulent conduct more generally (i.e., conduct not involving "state-
ments"), and also material omissions. Under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, it is unlawful for a fund making an offering pursuant to
Regulation D to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit
any fact so as to render any other statement made misleading.258 Rule
lOb-5 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
likewise prohibits making material omissions in connection with the
sale of any security. 259 In addition, the Advisers Act prohibits mate-
rial misstatements, misleading omissions, and other fraudulent prac-
tices to investors or prospective investors by any registered or
unregistered hedge fund advisor. 260 The Advisers Act prohibits any
fund manager from making false or misleading statements regarding
investment strategies, experience and credentials, risks associated with
256. See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 74 (noting that "[i]t is commonly observed that
hedge funds are 'opaque'-that is, information about their portfolios is typically lim-
ited and infrequently provided").
257. Regulation D, Preliminary Notes 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2007) (noting that
transactions pursuant to Regulation D "are not exempt from the antifraud, civil liabil-
ity, or other provisions of the federal securities laws").
258. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000) (applying its provisions to
"the offer or sale of any securities").
259. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2007).
260. Advisers Act §§ 206(4)-(8), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4-8 (2000).
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the fund, and valuation of the fund's assets.26' Furthermore, under the
Securities Act and the Advisers Act, fraudulent or misleading state-
ments or omissions do not require willful wrongdoing to be unlawful,
which means that hedge funds and their advisers may be prosecuted
by the SEC for mere negligence.2 62 Thus, if a fund makes any disclo-
sures to potential investors, it is required to make additional disclo-
sures to ensure no statements are misleading.2 63 The anti-fraud
provisions are an implied disclosure rule requiring true, accurate, and
comprehensive disclosures in connection with hedge fund offerings3z64
In addition, to qualify for a statutory private offering pursuant to
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, as hedge funds typically seek to do,
a fund must provide potential investors with access to the same type of
information as would be provided in a registration filed pursuant to
section 5 of the Securities Act.265 No amount of financial sophistica-
tion on the part of the offerees extinguishes the need to provide access
to information material to the decision whether to invest. 266 As a mat-
ter of business practice, and to comply with their legal duties under the
anti-fraud laws and section 4(2), hedge funds typically take the addi-
tional step of directly furnishing to potential investors a private place-
ment memorandum ("PPM"). 267  A PPM contains the type of
information that would be provided by a registration statement pub-
261. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72
Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,759 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
262. Id. at 44,759-60 (noting that negligent misstatements are prohibited under the
Advisers Act); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that because a
violation of either section 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act does not require
scienter, only a showing of negligence is required). Scienter is a "mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
263. See First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977)
(noting that "a duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes to say
anything").
264. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 4:2.2 (noting that "in light of various federal and
state anti-fraud provisions, a well advised hedge fund prepares a comprehensive offer-
ing memorandum, even if the offering is directed solely to accredited investors, to
ensure that all material information is conveyed"); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at
4 (noting that hedge funds generally make comprehensive disclosures to investors,
even though an SEC staff comment indicates that they are not required to do so).
265. See supra Part II.B.1.
266. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902 (1977); Lawler v.
Gilliam, 569 F.3d 1283, 1290 (1978).
267. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 46 ("Most hedge funds provide written
information to their investors in the form of a private offering memorandum or private
placement memorandum ('PPM')."); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 118 ("Instead
of merely providing access to information, the issuer may furnish directly the infor-
mation that would be provided by a registration statement, as in a private offering
memorandum that fully discloses such information.").
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licly filed under Section 5 of the Securities Act.2 68 A hedge fund's
disclosures in a PPM contain information similar to that required to be
disclosed on Form N-1A or Form S-i, in addition to the unique facts
and circumstances of the fund. 269 Accordingly, hedge funds typically
disclose the following information in connection with a private place-
ment: a basic description of the fund including its investment objec-
tives, strategies, and the types of securities the fund purchases; risks
pertaining to its investment strategy and regulatory and tax issues; a
description of how advisory fees are calculated and conflicts of inter-
est by the managers or other principals; a summary of the terms of the
fund, how it is managed and organized, and how investors can redeem
shares; and financial statements including net asset value and how it is
calculated.270
Hedge funds often make substantially greater and more intelligi-
ble disclosures than those found in a registration statement or made by
registered investment companies under the Company Act. These dis-
closures include detailed monthly or quarterly summaries of relevant
market conditions and trading strategies, relative performance data
compared to benchmarks such as hedge fund indices, equity indices,
and Treasury yields, and descriptions of what losses were attributable
to what strategies or investment group.271 Hedge fund disclosures
may also simplify the choices made by investors relative to investing
in mutual funds by providing Sharpe and Sortino ratios, which are two
ways of measuring the risk-adjusted performance of a fund. 272 As in-
stitutional investors become increasingly involved with hedge funds
and continue to demand substantial disclosures, comprehensive and
intelligible disclosures of these kinds will likely become ubiquitous. 273
In sum, hedge funds typically disclose to offerees and investors the
268. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-49 (describing the information typi-
cally disclosed in a PPM); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 118 ("A hedge fund's
private offering memorandum should contain all of the information required in a re-
gistration statement .... ").
269. LEDERMAN, supra note 20, § 4:2.2.
270. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-49; LEDERMAN, supra note 20,
§ 4:2.2; HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 144-59.
271. See Gibney & Leu, supra note 117, at 5.
272. Id. A Sortino ratio measures risk-adjusted performance using only extreme
downside movements to measure risk. See HedgeCo.Net, Sharpe Vs Sortino Ratio,
http://www.hedgeco.net/sharpe-ratio-sortino-ratio.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
273. See BANK OF N.Y. & CASEY, QUIRK & Assocs., supra note 51, at 11-12 (indi-
cating trend toward greater transparency); Christine Williamson, Demand by Clients
Gives Firms Offering Details on Portfolios a Competitive Edge, PENSIONS & INVEST-
MENTS, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071015/
PRINTSUB/71012043/1031/toc (reporting that because of "institutional investor de-
mand, both the level of portfolio transparency and the number of hedge fund manag-
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same type of information required to be disclosed under section 5 of
the Securities Act, and many make disclosures of a higher quality than
those made by registered investment companies. 274
The foregoing analysis covers those disclosures typically made
by hedge funds to be legally operational and competitively situated
among their peer firms. However, many hedge funds either choose to
or are legally required to make significant additional disclosures. For
instance, it is estimated that 50% of hedge fund managers voluntarily
register under the Advisers Act and submit to its disclosure require-
ments, and some portion of those do so to signal quality and accounta-
bility to investors.2 75 As of July 2007, about 1977 hedge fund
managers were registered with the SEC, 2 7 6 and a 2007 fund manager
survey found that 87% of all managers registered either with the SEC,
Commodities Future Trading Commission ("CFTC"), National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, or a state regulatory authority.277 Regis-
tration of a substantial portion of hedge fund advisers with a
regulatory authority indicates that many of the funds are willing to
increase their transparency to demonstrate accountability and attract
investors.
Under the Exchange Act, all hedge funds and their managers are
required to publicly disclose any large shareholdings of public compa-
nies to the SEC. Under sections 13(d) and 13(g), hedge funds or their
advisers must disclose beneficial ownership of greater than 5% in a
class of voting shares of securities registered under section 12 of the
Exchange Act and whether the purpose of such ownership is to ac-
quire or influence the issuer.2 78 Section 16(a) requires hedge funds to
disclose ownership of 10% or more in any class of voting equity se-
ers willing to provide that transparency have increased dramatically during the past
two years").
274. See Gibney & Leu supra note 117, at 5.
275. HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 17 (noting that "some investment advisers
choose to register with the SEC to gain whatever marketing cachet SEC registration
might afford or to avoid potentially more burdensome or less predictable state regis-
tration"); SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 n.76; Registration Under the Advis-
ers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,181 n.98 (July 28,
2004) (estimating that 30 to 50% of hedge fund managers voluntarily register); The
Hedge Fund 100, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 2002, at 43 (finding that disclosure
among the largest 100 hedge fund managers is becoming more common).
276. Siobhan Hughes, Fund Advisers Deregister, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2007, at A4.
277. Press Release, Hennessee Group LLC, HENNESSEE GROUP LLC RELEASES 13TH
ANNUAL HEDGE FUND MANAGER SURVEY (May 1, 2007), available at http://
www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/release2007O5O1.html.
278. Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000); Exchange Act § 13(g), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(g) (2000); Exchange Act Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a)
(2007).
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curities registered pursuant to the Exchange Act, including any subse-
quent changes in ownership of such securities. 279 In addition, under
section 13(f), hedge funds owning more than $100 million in stock
traded on a national exchange or on the NASDAQ are required to
quarterly disclose to the SEC their equity holdings on Form 13 F, 280 a
disclosure more likely to be made as the median size of hedge funds
increases. Certain hedge funds investing in commodities must register
and make substantial additional disclosures under the Commodities
and Exchange Act and are subject to inspection and regulation by the
CFTC. 28 1
3. Transparency Through Third Party Information Providers
In its proposed rule increasing the net worth required to be an
accredited investor in hedge funds, the SEC asserted that "minimal"
information about hedge funds exists in the public domain. 282 Al-
though hedge funds are not subject to all aspects of the federal system
of registration and disclosure,283 the SEC's claim that minimal infor-
mation about the funds is in the public domain fails to account for the
overwhelming and growing amount of publicly available information
about all aspects of the hedge fund industry, much of which is availa-
ble at no cost over the Internet or through public libraries.
Information about hedge funds in the public domain, much of
which is accessible to a general audience, includes: book-length treat-
ments;284 academic, industry, and government studies; 285 and cover-
age in the popular press.286 News services, blogs, and other sources of
information provide, in near real-time, news and analysis of the indus-
279. Exchange Act § 16(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78p(a)(1) (2000); Exchange Act Rule
16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1-2 (2007).
280. Exchange Act Rule 13f-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-l(a)(1) (2007).
281. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 170-79.
282. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 412.
283. Ultimately, the relative lack of publicly available information about hedge
funds is due in substantial part to the prohibitions against general solicitation and
advertising under Regulation D and can and should be remedied for the reasons de-
tailed in Part IV.A.3 infra.
284. See, e.g., BARTON BIGGS, HEDGEHOGGING (2006); RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, A
DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINAN-
CIAL INNOVATION (2007).
285. See, e.g., C-R. FOR INT'L SEC. & DERIVATIVES MKTS., THE BENEFITS OF HEDGE
FUNDS: 2006 UPDATE (2006), available at http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/research/pdf-
files/benefitsofhedgefunds.pdf; BEmSTEIN GLOBAL WEALTH MGMT., HEDGE FUNDS:
Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING? (2006), available at https://www.bemstein.com/Cm-
sObjectPC/pdfs/B32267 HFTooMuchGoodThing.pdf.
286. See, e.g., Behind the Hedge, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Apr. 9, 2007, http://nymag.com/
news/features/hedgefunds/.
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try.287 Indeed, this Article was authored entirely based on publicly
available information. The following is just a small indication of the
kind of information freely available through the Internet: the distribu-
tion of hedge funds by the types and levels of fees they charged from
1981 to 2006,288 publications discussing the sources and impact of
potential conflicts of interest,289 and several different measures of
hedge fund risk and risk-adjusted performance by type of hedge fund
from 1997 to 2006 .290
Beyond general information about hedge funds, third parties also
provide fund-specific information in a way that increases the overall
quality of disclosures about hedge funds. Thus, in determining
whether retail investors are sufficiently sophisticated to make in-
formed investment choices regarding hedge funds, disclosures by third
parties must be taken into consideration. Even if hedge fund issuers
fail to make disclosures regarding particular items of information,
third parties may make such disclosures and add to the overall quality
of disclosures about a fund.
For instance, in 2005, Morningstar, an established provider of in-
formation and ratings of mutual funds, began to offer detailed reports
on separate hedge fund issuers.29 1 It currently rates more than 6000
separate funds (nearly 60% of the U.S. market) and has plans to ex-
287. See, e.g., New York Times, Dealbook: Hedge Funds, http://
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/category/hedge-funds; Seeking Alpha, Hedge Funds,
http://seekingalpha.com/tag/hedge-funds. The role of hedge funds in the summer
2007 credit-market losses were immediately analyzed by no less than two academic
studies. See NOEL AMENC, THREE EARLY LESSONS FROM THE SUBPRIME LENDING
CRISIS: A FRENCH ANSWER TO PRESIDENT SARKOZY (2007), available at http://
docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/071008_subprime/EDHEC-Subprime-CrisisStudy.pdf;
Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?
(Nov. 4, 2007) (unpublished paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1015987).
288. BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 26-37.
289. See, e.g., Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist and Dir., Office of Econ. Analysis,
SEC, Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management, Keynote Address at Hedge Fund
Compliance and Regulation Conference (May 12, 2005), available at http:II
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch0512O5css.htm; Tom Nohel et al., Side-By-Side Man-
agement of Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds (Dec. 2006) (unpublished paper, availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891867).
290. See V9RONIQUE LE SOURD, EDHEC RISK & ASSET MGMT. RESEARCH CTR.,




291. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Morningstar Expands Hedge Funds Survey, Eyes More,
REUTERS.COM, Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/fundsFundsNews/id
USN3042541320070430.
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pand.292 These reports provide all of the information identified above
as required by retail investors to make informed investment
choices. 293 Although Morningstar hedge fund reports are currently
only available to qualified institutional buyers, a retail hedge fund
market would very likely give the incentive for such reports to become
available at low or no cost to retail investors. Morningstar, Business-
Week, and numerous other institutions provide free online ratings of
mutual funds and highly readable presentations of the funds' risk, cor-
relation to the market, historical returns, and the identity of the fund
manager.294 To continue to serve retail clientele, such organizations
would likely provide the same information about hedge funds for free
or at low cost, providing further assurance that retail investors would
have the ability to make informed investment decisions.
In sum, hedge funds make substantial and comprehensive disclo-
sures to comply with anti-fraud laws, section 4(2) of the Securities
Act, and other federal laws and also make additional important disclo-
sures to attract investors and comply with industry norms. Third-party
providers are also beginning to furnish all of the information required
by a sophisticated retail investor to make informed investment deci-
sions. These disclosures demonstrate that sophisticated retail inves-
tors do not need the protections of the Securities Act and Company
Act when investing in hedge funds. Exemptions should therefore be
provided for hedge fund securities sold to sophisticated retail
investors.
4. The Risk and Complexity of Hedge Funds
The SEC takes the view that investing in hedge funds is funda-
mentally riskier and more complicated than investing in issuers regis-
tered under the securities laws. 295 However, the SEC's approach to
hedge fund risk fails to recognize that the funds' risk must be evalu-
ated in the context of their contribution to the overall risk of an invest-
292. Id.
293. For example, Morningstar Direct hedge fund reports provide information about
historical return by year and across numerous monthly time frames, fees, several mea-
sures of correlation with the market, several measures of risk including the worst
months, and how many negative months the hedge fund experienced. See
Morningstar Hedge Fund Data, http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/documents/
HedgeFund/HFOneSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); Morningstar Hedge Fund
Data Points List, http://corporate.morningstar.comUS/documents/HedgeFund/
HedgeFundDataPointList.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
294. See Morningstar, Mutual Fund Performance and Ratings, http://www.moming
star.com/cover/funds.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); BusinessWeek, Mutual Fund
Scoreboard, http://bwnt.businessweek.com/mutual-fund/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
295. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 404.
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ment portfolio, rather than as a stand-alone risk.296 The SEC correctly
observes that hedge funds "involve risks not generally associated with
many other issuers of securities. '2 97 However, there is a fundamental
difference between having unique risks and being riskier to investors.
According to mainstream finance scholarship, the risks of hedge
funds, when considered in isolation, do not accurately reflect the risks
hedge funds pose to investors. Rather, risk is the impact that adding
hedge funds to a traditional portfolio has on the likelihood of the port-
folio experiencing losses. As detailed above, hedge funds' unique
risks are mostly beneficial to a traditional portfolio precisely because
investments with "risks not generally associated with many other issu-
ers of securities" allow investors to reduce overall portfolio risk
through diversification.2 98
Additionally, in today's investment marketplace, retail investors
cannot avoid highly complex investment risk. Even simple invest-
ment strategies are complicated because of the complexity of issuers'
business operations in a global and information-based economy. For
example, retail investors in registered information technology, finan-
cial services, and health care provider companies (e.g., Cisco Systems,
Citigroup, and Medtronic, respectively) likely have little understand-
ing of the complex technological, financial, and scientific expertise
underlying their securities' values or the risks to which such compa-
nies are exposed through inflation, foreign exchange fluctuations, pat-
ent acquisitions, and regulatory developments. 299 Furthermore, as
detailed above, a wide variety of highly complicated investment strat-
egies with the same general risks associated with hedge funds are (or
will soon be) available to retail investors through publicly traded alter-
native asset managers, hedged mutual funds, hedge fund clones, ETFs,
and low-cost at-home trading platforms.3°° Even though these securi-
ties are registered and make periodic disclosures pursuant to the fed-
eral securities laws, they are not less complicated or less risky than
unregistered hedge funds.
296. See supra Part I.C.
297. Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 404.
298. See supra Part I.C.
299. See APPLIED RESEARCH AND CONSULTING LLC, supra note 242, at 6-10 (find-
ing that 65% of surveyed investors failed a basic market literacy survey); Susanna
Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 185
(2006) (arguing that ordinary investors often lack the skills to properly interpret "the
structure and operations of business organizations today [which] are more complex
than ever").
300. See supra Part I.D.2.
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C. The Impact of Wealth-Based Investor Qualifications
Permitting only wealthy investors to have access to hedge funds
conflicts with the SEC's duty to advance the public interest and pro-
tect investors. 30' Sophisticated retail investors are harmed when the
law does not permit them to invest in hedge funds and reduce eco-
nomic losses to their portfolios. Unsophisticated retail investors are
not harmed by increasing access because such investors would be very
unlikely to express any desire for and undertake the steps necessary to
invest in the funds. Even if unsophisticated investors purchased hedge
fund shares, the funds are not more prone to fraud or investor abuse
than registered investment vehicles 30 2 and are also not more compli-
cated or risky than a wide range of investments available to all retail
investors. Wealth-based qualifications, therefore, do not protect retail
investors from bearing the risks associated with hedge funds and do
not prevent investors from undertaking investments which may be too
complicated for their level of financial sophistication. The impact of
wealth-based qualifications is to deprive retail investors of access to
the full range of investment opportunities commensurate with their
level of financial sophistication.
Although the SEC and other financial markets regulators are gen-
erally content with preserving wealth-based criteria for qualifying to
invest in hedge funds, 30 3 the SEC has expressed a desire to increase
access to hedge funds while maintaining investor protection. 304 The
301. See Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000).
302. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 73 ("There is no evidence indicating that
hedge funds or their advisers engage disproportionately in fraudulent activity."); Reg-
ulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Patrick J. McCarty, Gen.
Counsel to the CFTC), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ files/mccarty.pdf (stat-
ing that from 1999 to 2004 less than 3% of total CFTC and SEC enforcement actions
were against hedge funds or hedge fund managers).
303. See Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/tsO72506cc.
htm (stating that hedge funds "are not investments for Mom and Pop. They are gener-
ally risky ventures that simply don't make sense for most retail investors" and that
retail investors having access to hedge funds would be a development to be "viewed
with alarm"); Anthony Ryan, Assistant Sec'y for Fin. Mkts., U.S. Dept. of the Trea-
sury, Remarks at World Hedge Fund Forum (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp296.htm.
304. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 103-04 (recommending that the SEC ex-
amine wide use of hedge fund strategies by publicly registered investment compa-
nies); The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market
Risk: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 23 (2003)
(statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC) ("I think there is a definite need
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reforms proposed below explain how to accomplish that goal. Several
foreign jurisdictions have successfully permitted retail investors to in-
vest in hedge funds, and other foreign jurisdictions are in the process
of expanding access. 30 5 Given the capabilities of U.S. financial mar-
kets, wealth-based qualifications deny to U.S. investors the benefits of
hedge funds enjoyed by their peers around the world.
IV.
REFORMS TO CREATE A U.S. MARKET FOR
RETAIL HEDGE FUNDS
There are several ways to reform the existing two-tiered regula-
tory structure to allow sophisticated retail investors to have access to
hedge funds without compromising investor protection. This Part pro-
poses several reforms that preserve the characteristics and beneficial
features of hedge funds, maintain investor protection, and make the
business of providing retail hedge funds profitable and otherwise at-
tractive to large financial firms. Indeed, the nature of hedge fund bus-
iness and the experience of retail funds in foreign jurisdictions
demonstrate that the primary concern regarding any reform proposal is
not whether unsophisticated investors will begin to invest in hedge
funds to their detriment. Rather, the issue is whether retail investors
will choose to invest in hedge funds and whether the new structure
will provide an attractive environment for funds to market and sell to
retail investors.306
To address such concerns, the reforms proposed here seek to cre-
ate a retail FOHF that raises capital through a private placement to an
underwriter (or syndicate of underwriters) who, in turn, lists the secur-
ities of the retail FOHF on a trading platform accessible only by so-
to examine how hedge funds, properly run and properly disclosed, can be allowed to
be purchased by retail investors ... ").
305. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE REGULATION, TAXATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF HEDGE FUNDS IN EUROPE: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (4th ed.
2006) (reviewing retail access to hedge funds in Europe); AXISS AUSTRALIAN, THE
HEDGE FUNDS INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA (2006-07) (examination by the Australian
Government's Financial Services Division of the substantial involvement with hedge
funds by Australian retail investors and applicable regulations); Janine Canham &
Manoj Ramachandran, Hedge Funds: Asia Leads the Retail Market, ASIA L. & PRAC.,
Dec. 2003 (noting that in Asia, hedge funds "have become an increasingly important
element of a well-balanced portfolio investment strategy"); James Daley, FSA All-
Clear for Retail Investors to Put Money into Hedge Funds, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 28, 2007.
306. See Ferguson, supra note 239, at I (noting that a U.K.-based survey "concluded
that there was no great desire among product producers to produce and sell retail
hedge funds and no great demand among investors for such products."); Hedge Funds
Flock to Hong Kong, supra note 239.
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phisticated investors. This way, hedge funds will not have to bear
transaction costs in dealing with numerous individual investors and
can continue to accept investments from FOHFs as they currently do.
Furthermore, retail investors will be more likely to invest in hedge
funds if their shares are listed on an easily accessible, Web-based trad-
ing platform as is currently in operation for other types of privately
placed securities. 30 7 Before turning to the specific proposed regula-
tory reforms, it is worthwhile to first summarize their ultimate goal.
The proposed reforms seek to create a retail hedge fund that:
* is an unregistered fund of hedge funds;
* is purchased only by sophisticated retail investors;
* is advised by a hedge fund manager registered with the SEC,
the CFTC, a state regulatory authority, or a self-regulatory
organization;
* is advised by a manager co-investing into the fund to align in-
centives with investors;
" discloses material information about the strategy pursued by
the fund and the identity of the manager;
" discloses material information about the fund's return history,
absolute risk, and correlation with general market risks;
" may engage in any manner of legal trading strategy including
the use of leverage;
" may charge management and performance fees (with or with-
out high water marks and hurdle rates);
" may place limitations on the ability of investors to redeem
capital;
• has its shares traded on a private electronic trading platform;
and
" may engage in general advertising and solicitation.
Allowing only registered investment advisers to sponsor and
manage retail FOHFs is likely to ensure an adequate level of trans-
parency about the fund manager, its investment strategy, and other
important details due to the mandatory disclosures required to be
made by registered advisers.3°8 At the same time, given the large
number of successfully operating hedge funds advised by a registered
investment adviser, requiring an adviser to a retail FOHF to register
likely would not infringe upon the fund's operations, require overly
burdensome or redundant disclosures about a fund, or require the fund
to disclose proprietary trading strategies. Indeed, the large financial
307. See infra notes 328-329 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
[Vol. 11:251
2008] HEDGE FUND MARKET FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 311
firms likely to sponsor retail FOHFs for U.S. investors, such as
Goldman Sachs and Fidelity Investments, are already registered advis-
ers in part because they advise registered investment companies such
as mutual funds. The following specific reforms are likely to achieve
a widely utilized and valuable retail hedge fund product with the fore-
going characteristics and operations.
A. Increase Access to Unregistered Investment Companies
To provide the most benefits to investors, retail FOHFs must be
able to charge performance fees, use substantial amounts of leverage,
and also retain significant flexibility in trading strategies, among other
characteristics. Registered investment company status is an unwork-
able regulatory posture through which to operate a genuine hedge fund
because the Company Act severely limits or entirely prohibits regis-
tered funds from engaging in these activities commonplace among
hedge funds and FOHFs. 309 Although the Company Act could theo-
retically be amended to allow hedge funds to operate with their char-
acteristic properties, registered company status is so unsuited for
hedge fund operations that only substantial legislative reforms to the
Company Act would allow retail FOHFs to efficiently operate within
its framework. 310
Sophisticated retail investors therefore need to be able to
purchase the securities of an investment fund not meeting the defini-
tion of investment company under the Company Act. An unregistered
3(c)(7) fund is the most suitable structure currently available for a
retail FOHF because, unlike a 3(c)(1) fund, a 3(c)(7) fund may have
an unlimited number of investors (so long as they are qualified) and is
not subject to the Advisers Act's prohibition on being charged a per-
formance fee by its manager.311
However, reforms must be made to enable a 3(c)(7) fund to ac-
cept capital from retail investors in a way consistent with achieving
the desired features of retail hedge funds. The SEC is authorized
under section 2(a)(51)(B) of the Company Act to amend the definition
309. See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
310. Reforms seeking to expand retail access to hedge funds by amending the Com-
pany Act to allow mutual funds to engage in hedge fund-like strategies are deficient
because they fail to allow hedge funds to operate with all of their defining characteris-
tics which are likely to benefit investors. See Lacey, supra note 119, at 78-82 (pro-
posing to reform the Company Act to allow greater utilization of hedge fund trading
strategies yet without the ability to charge performance fees); SEC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 2, at 103-04 (advocating broader access to hedge fund strategies "through
the registered investment company structure").
311. See Advisers Act § 205(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(4) (2000).
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of "qualified purchaser" as it determines is "necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. '312 Because
allowing retail investors to have access to hedge funds helps to protect
sophisticated investors from economic loss and is highly unlikely to
harm unsophisticated investors, the public interest would be advanced
if the following reforms were made. The SEC should add a new cate-
gory of natural person meeting the definition of qualified purchaser to
include any natural person:
• sophisticated and otherwise qualified for the purposes of a pri-
vate offering to nonaccredited investors pursuant to Rule 506 of
Regulation D of the Securities Act;
" purchasing securities from an investment fund exempt from the
definition of "investment company" under Section 3(c)(7) of this
Act; and
" purchasing securities from such an investment fund advised by a
registered investment adviser owning sufficient assets of the in-
vestment fund or acquired funds to align incentives with
investors.
This new definition of qualified purchaser does not open 3(c)(7)
funds to all retail investors. Although the new definition vastly
widens the availability of 3(c)(7) funds by not necessarily requiring
individuals to possess $5 million in investments, it only opens 3(c)(7)
FOHFs to retail investors if the investor or his or her purchaser repre-
sentative is sophisticated, and the fund is advised by a registered in-
vestment adviser with a significant co-investment in the fund.
By referring to the definition of investor sophistication under
Regulation D, a sophisticated retail investor in a 3(c)(7) FOHF would
still be required to be furnished with information "material to an un-
derstanding of the issuer, its business and the securities. ' 313 This
practice would not only protect investors but would be unlikely to
impose any additional costs upon the retail FOHF as hedge funds typi-
cally already disclose substantial information upon which a sophisti-
cated investor can make an informed investment decision.314
B. Enable a Secondary Market for Shares of Retail Hedge Funds
The SEC should also enact reforms to allow the creation of a
robust secondary market for shares of retail FOHFs. A secondary
312. Company Act § 2(a)(51)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(B) (2000).
313. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (2007). This information is similar to
the type required in Part I of a registration statement, must be more extensive the
larger the offering, and requires employment of an independent auditor for offerings
over $2 million. Id.
314. See supra Part HI.B.2.
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market would increase the liquidity of hedge fund shares beyond the
quarterly redemptions typically allowed by the funds. 315 The ability
to sell shares on a short-term basis would make investors in the fund
better off because they could exit the fund as they deemed appropriate.
A liquid secondary market effectively serves the purpose of being able
to daily redeem shares from the fund at net asset value, as is required
by open-end registered mutual funds.316 The SEC has already deemed
a sufficiently liquid secondary market as an adequate substitute for
direct redemption at net asset value. 317 FOHFs would probably also
be more willing to sell shares to a retail clientele knowing they would
be subject to fewer expenses and disruptions involved with redeeming
shares to investors who would be able to exit by selling to other inves-
tors. Increased liquidity would also promote price discovery, meaning
that the true value of a fund's underlying assets would be more accu-
rately known by investors and other market participants as those val-
ues changed over time.318
To facilitate the liquidity and transparency of retail hedge fund
securities through a secondary market mechanism, the SEC should ex-
tend to sophisticated retail investors exemptions already in place for
private resales to certain institutional investors. In 1990, the SEC
adopted Rule 144A under the Securities Act to allow resales to large
institutional investors of privately placed securities. 319 Rule 144A
was adopted to attract foreign issuers to U.S. markets by establishing
"a more liquid and efficient institutional resale market for unregistered
securities. ' '320 As then-SEC Chairman Richard C. Breedon noted,
Rule 144A
315. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
316. See Company Act § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2000).
317. Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Investment Mgmt., SEC, Regulatory Issues Involv-
ing Exchange Traded Funds, Speech at the American Stock Exchange Symposium on
Exchange Traded Funds (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch534.htm ("Because exchange traded fund shares are only redeemable in
large creation units, the funds must obtain relief from the requirement that fund shares
be individually redeemable .... Shares on the secondary market typically trade at or
near NAV because of arbitrage opportunities. Thus, investors in exchange traded
funds generally should be able to sell their shares in the secondary market for a price
at, or near, NAV-even if they cannot redeem individual shares directly from the
fund.").
318. Price discovery is a process where trading by buyers and sellers results in the
"discovery" of a price reflecting the value market participants place on an asset. See
Randall S. Kroszner, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at
Institute of International Bankers Annual Breakfast Dialogue, Washington, D.C. (Oct.
22, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner
20071022a.htm.
319. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 154, at 391-96.
320. Id. at 391 (quoting Sec. Act Rel. 6862, 46 SEC Dock. 26, 28 (1990)).
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will bring enhanced market liquidity and efficiency for investors in
the burgeoning private placement market, together with direct ac-
cess to foreign issues in the U.S. institutional capital markets.
[It will also] enhance the ability of issuers to raise capital and will
expand the investment alternatives available to U.S. investors.32 1
Rule 144A provides a non-exclusive safe harbor for sales by
dealers or other sellers of securities not registered pursuant to Section
5 of the Securities Act.322 Rule 144A requires, among other condi-
tions, that private sales are only made to "qualified institutional buy-
ers" (QIB) having at least $100 million in assets. 323 Foreign issuers
take advantage of Rule 144A to privately raise capital in U.S. markets
by first privately placing securities with investment banks acting as
underwriters who, in turn, sell to QIBs. 324 By the terms of Rule 144A,
persons purchasing securities through a private placement under the
Securities Act with the intent to resell to QIBs are not deemed under-
writers and therefore able to sell without registering the securities. 325
The benefits to QIBs under Rule 144A would apply equally as
well to sophisticated retail investors. Allowing a resale market for
hedge fund securities would bring enhanced liquidity, efficiency, and
investment alternatives to retail investors through the burgeoning
hedge fund market. Since its inception in 1990 through 2006, the total
equity and debt raised in 144A transactions has gone from $4.9 billion
to about $1 trillion. 326 Indeed, in 2006 the value of 144A equity is-
321. Robert A. Barron, Control and Restricted Securities: Some Comments on SEC
Rule 144A, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 400, 400-01 (1990).
322. Securities Act Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2006) (providing that sales
made in accordance with its provisions are not "distributions" under the Securities Act
such that re-sellers are not deemed underwriters).
323. Securities Act Rule 144A(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d) (2006); Luis F. Moreno
Trevifio, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers: Rule 144A Private
Placements, 16 HOUSTON J. INT'L. L., 159, 175-76 (1993).
324. Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am.
Bar Assoc., to John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 16 (Mar. 22, 2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/comments/
20070322000000.pdf ("Investment banks (individually or in small or large syndicates)
purchase securities from issuers in transactions exempt under § 4(2), pursuant to
purchase agreements that look very much like underwriting agreements, and resell to
QIBs in accordance with Rule 144A, using offering memoranda that look very much
like prospectuses used in registered public offerings.").
325. Securities Act Rule 144A(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(b) ("Any person, other
than the issuer or a dealer, who offers or sells securities in compliance with the condi-
tions set forth in paragraph (d) of this section shall be deemed not to be engaged in a
distribution of such securities and therefore not to be an underwriter of such securities
. .. "); Securities Act Rule 144A(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(c) (same as to dealers).
326. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 154, at 396 n.52; Liz Moyer, Barely Private
Exchanges, FORBES.COM, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/08/
14/private-placement-exchanges-biz-cx-lm_0814private.html.
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sues, for the first time, surpassed that raised on public U.S. exchanges
and also brought the 144A market to nearly the same size as the U.S.
hedge fund industry. 327 However, simply permitting retail investors to
sell hedge fund shares to other sophisticated investors would not no-
ticeably improve liquidity without an organized exchange through
which the shares can be traded at low cost. Fortunately, recent innova-
tions in financial markets demonstrate that such a market would be
established and policed by large investment banks and other financial
intermediaries.
In 2007, full-scale private trading of placed securities not regis-
tered under the Securities Act began to take place. Several large fi-
nancial institutions established a private electronic exchange, creating
a relatively liquid marketplace for trading 144A securities among
QIBs. On May 21, 2007 the Goldman Sachs Tradable Unregistered
Equity market became the first trading platform for 144A securities
and sold $880 million of equity in alternative asset manager, Oaktree
Capital Management. 328 On August 15, 2007, NASDAQ began trad-
ing on its own Web-based trading platform for 144A securities
(named PORTAL) with 600 equity securities from companies such as
Archer Daniels Midland Company and Korea-based Samsung. 329
Index funds and ETFs based upon the performance of shares on POR-
TAL are likely to be developed for retail investors, 330 suggesting that
hedge funds privately traded on such platforms would also have wide-
spread appeal. While other financial institutions such as Bear Stems,
Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup initially planned to establish their
own 144A trading platforms, they ultimately agreed to join the other
exchange providers to establish a single private exchange for 144A
securities operated by NASDAQ. 33 1
327. Moyer, supra note 326.
328. Kathleen M. McBride, Going Private: Sea Change for Private Equity 144A
Investing and Issuing, INVESTMENT ADVISOR, July 2007, available at http://
www.investmentadvisor.com/article.phparticle=7904.
329. Moyer, supra note 326; Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ's Electronic Trad-
ing Platform for the 144A Private Placement Market Is Approved by the SEC (Aug. 1,
2007), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/newsroomnewsStory.
aspx?textpath=pr2007%5ACQPMZ200708010800PRIMZONEFULLFEED 125065.
htm.
330. Interview by Mark Gongloff with John Jacobs, Executive Vice President of
NASDAQ, by teleconference in New York (Aug. 15, 2007) (video available at http://
video.msn.com/dw.aspx?mkt=en-us&from=truveo&vid=OcO2fc81- 3e4e-4af7-839 1 -
I el e56eafbf5).
331. Moyer, supra note 326; Lynn Cowan, Banks to Share Platform for 144A
Trades, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2007, at C3.
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These developments strongly suggest that large financial institu-
tions have the capabilities and incentives to establish a profitable trad-
ing platform for the shares of privately placed retail FOHFs securities.
The trading platform for retail hedge fund shares could, at low cost,
ensure investor protection by only allowing sophisticated retail inves-
tors to use the platform. The PORTAL system uses an application
process requiring new users to verify they are QIBs, and a platform for
retail hedge fund shares could do the same for sophisticated retail in-
vestors. Similarly, it is standard practice among issuers privately plac-
ing securities to nonaccredited investors pursuant to Rule 506 to
require investors to sign a representation concerning their sophistica-
tion and complete a questionnaire regarding their experience. 332 It is
thus extremely unlikely that an investor without a sufficient under-
standing of hedge fund investments would go through the trouble to
register for a retail hedge fund trading platform. Numerous financial
products and trading techniques, including hedge fund clones and "do-
it-yourself' hedging strategies, are available for those desiring alterna-
tives to traditional investments without having to be certified by a pri-
vate exchange.
To avoid triggering Exchange Act registration and reporting re-
quirements, proprietors of the retail hedge fund trading platform
would have to keep track of the number of investors in an issuer to
ensure the number does not exceed 499, just as the platforms currently
do for 144A investors. 333 However, to protect investors through ad-
ded liquidity, and to ensure that retail FOHFs are able to raise suffi-
cient capital through a retail offering, the SEC should substantially
increase from 499 the number of investors allowed before triggering
the requirements of the Exchange Act. The SEC has express authority
under section 12(h) of the Exchange Act to increase the number of
investors allowed in an issuer not required to register so long as the
amendment advances the public interest and investor protection. 334
The Exchange Act specifically contemplates the SEC amending its
exemptions to "classify issuers and prescribe requirements appropriate
for each such class. ' 335 In addition, a primary purpose of the Ex-
change Act is to facilitate accurate valuation of securities through sec-
ondary markets.336 Accordingly, the SEC should amend the Exchange
332. See HAMMER ET AL., supra note 16, at 124.
333. Moyer, supra note 326 (reporting that private exchanges "offer investor track-
ing to make sure the issuer doesn't tip over the 499 maximum investor threshold.").
334. Exchange Act § 12(h), 15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (2000).
335. Id.
336. See Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 221, at 1048.
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Act to increase the number of investors permitted to own the securities
of a retail FOHF as proposed here. The guiding principles for increas-
ing the number of investors in an investment company not reporting
under the Exchange Act are to increase the liquidity of hedge fund
shares and thereby increase transparency and valuation accuracy of the
fund and allow timely exits from retail hedge fund investments with-
out disrupting fund operations. It is difficult to determine how many
more investors than 499 are likely required to obtain a sufficient
amount of liquidity and attract sponsors. However, given that 79% of
new hedge funds (including FOHFs) have less than $50 million in
assets and many European FOHFs have less than $100 million in as-
sets, 337 the number of investors permitted into such funds would likely
have to be substantially larger that 499 to permit a retail FOHF to raise
enough funds to be sufficiently capitalized.
C. Permit General Solicitation and Advertising
To foster greater transparency among all hedge funds, including
retail hedge funds, the SEC should amend Rule 502 of Regulation D
to permit the funds to engage in general solicitation and advertising.
The SEC's assessment that less information about hedge funds is
available to the general public compared to information available
about issuers registered under the securities laws is, to some extent,
correct. However, the fact that less information is available about
hedge funds is, in part, a result of the securities laws' prohibitions on
advertising and solicitation. Allowing hedge funds to advertise and
solicit investors would not enable unsophisticated retail investors to
purchase the funds on private trading platforms (nor likely make them
desire to invest in the funds), and it would promote greater and more
accurate public awareness of hedge funds and also increase their trans-
parency to investors, academics, industry researchers, and regulators.
The SEC has, at various times, questioned the ban on advertising
and solicitation. In 1995, and again in 1996, the SEC requested public
comment on whether it should amend the prohibition. 338 In its 2003
staff report on hedge funds, the SEC noted there was no compelling
policy justification for limiting advertising and solicitation by 3(c)(7)
337. BARTH ET AL., supra note 23, at 9 tbl.7; Deutsche Bank, supra note 121, at 19.
338. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH McLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND
THE SECURITIES LAWS, § 7.07, 7-28 (4th ed. 2006); Exemption for Certain California
Limited Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,638 (July 10, 1995) (soliciting public comment "on
whether the prohibition against general solicitation in certain Regulation D offerings
should be reconsidered"); Securities Acts Concepts and Their Effects on Capital For-
mation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,184 (Sept. 18, 1996) (extending comment period).
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funds open only to sophisticated qualified purchasers. 339 Finally, in
evaluating the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies recommended that
the ban on solicitation and advertising be eliminated for those inves-
tors not needing all the protections of the Securities Act's registration
requirements, including sophisticated natural persons.340 Fostering a
transparent hedge fund market for sophisticated retail investors affords
the SEC an opportunity to act upon recommendations.
CONCLUSION
Hedge funds have helped wealthy individuals diversify their port-
folios and thereby reduce economic losses. The reforms proposed in
this Article seek to extend the benefits of hedge funds to retail inves-
tors-nonwealthy individuals. Unfortunately, although having ex-
pressed interest in expanding access to hedge fund strategies, the SEC
is more recently moving to ensure that only the wealthiest individuals
in the United States have access to the funds. Currently, the SEC is
attempting to increase the wealth required to invest in hedge funds to
$2.5 million in investable assets. If successful, this increase will re-
duce the portion of the U.S. households able to invest in hedge funds
and other private investment pools by 85%-to a mere 1.3%.341 Al-
though this Article finds that the goal of investor protection will be
furthered by increasing access to hedge funds, and other nations offer
retail investors access or are undertaking reforms to do so, the SEC is
moving in the opposite direction to the detriment of U.S. retail
investors.
A retail FOHF listed on a private trading platform and accessible
only to sophisticated investors would further investor protection. Re-
tail investors investing in such a product would likely possess enough
financial acumen and be furnished with sufficiently high-quality dis-
closures to make informed choices. In remarking on the purpose of
the Securities Act in 1977, the court in Doran observed that
The Act is practical and pragmatic, not dogmatic and doctrinaire. It
is designed to give a panoply of protection to the investor, but also
to allow play in the marts of trade for offers of securities that do not
require the oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Comnission. 342
339. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 100-01.
340. ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. Cos., FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED
STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 76-78 (2006).
341. See Accredited Natural Person Rule, supra note 3, at 406.
342. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corop, 545 F.2d 893, 904 (1977).
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In the modem financial marketplace, the securities of a FOHF
open only to sophisticated retail investors are of the type not requiring
the full scope of SEC oversight. Hedge funds not fully subject to the
federal system of registration and disclosure are just as appropriate for
sophisticated retail investors as are registered investment funds. Al-
lowing sophisticated retail investors to have access to hedge funds will
not increase the risks to which they are already exposed. Greater ac-
cess to hedge funds will, however, help sophisticated retail investors
fend for themselves.
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